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The Economic Realities of a
"Security": Is There a More
Meaningful Formula?
Ronald I. Coffey
The existence of a "security" is of vital importance in determining
whether the federal and state securities laws will apply to certain trans-
actions. The continually widening scope of such laws has prompted Pro-
fessor Coffey first to discuss briefly the definition sections of the federal
statute and then to examine the basic formula propounded by the Su-
preme Court for determining the existence of a security. After submit-
ting that the twenty-year-old formula might be lacking in some areas,
the author proposes and then thoroughly discusses his own theory which
is based upon the essential economic considerations underlying the "se-
curity" concept. Professor Coffey concludes with a discussion of statutory
construction in light of the formulas proposed by the courts and the def-
inition sections of the statutes.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem and Its Importance
I ECENT YEARS have witnessed a substantial increase in the
number of statutory roads to redress available to the disen-
chanted purchaser of a "security." On the frontiers of this expansion
of remedies is the increased use
THE AUTHOR (B.A., Xavier University of SEC Rule 10b-5' as the ba-
(Ohio), LL.B., University of Cincinnati, sis of fraud-type actions brought
LLM., Harvard University) is an As-
sistant Professor of Law at Western Re- by securities buyers. Despite
serve University and is a member of persuasive arguments to the
the Ohio Bar. His current teaching have been
specialties include Contracts and Corpo- contrary 2  buyers
rations, rather successful in circum-
venting the restrictions8 im-
posed on actions under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933'
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964), promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964) [hereinafter cited as Ex-
change Act].
2 3 LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1778-97 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1962).
3 Id. at 1779-80. Such restrictions include a short statute of limitations, relief lim-
ited to rescission while the plaintiff is still in possession of the purchased securities, and
the possibility that security for costs and reasonable attorneys' fees may be required.
448 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964) [hereinafter cited as Secur-
ities Act].
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simply by pursuing a cause of action under Rule 10b-5' or even
under section 17(a) of the Securities Act.6
While adding to the number of remedial arrows in the quiver of
the securities purchaser, the courts and administrative agencies have
also increased the range of those arrows by evolving what has been
termed the "Expanding 'Securities' Concept."'  While the proposi-
tion that the "security" concept itself is expanding may be debated,
it is unquestionably true that the last half decade has seen many
devices and transactions brought within the pale of the state and
federal securities laws,' all to the great chagrin of many practicing
attorneys. The inclusion of an ever-widening variety of transactions
within the definition of "security," coupled with the tendency of the
courts to give buyers a wider choice of statutory remedies, has sub-
stantially magnified the impact of the securities laws on the business
community.' At the very least, the prospect that these statutes
might continue to grow "at both ends" (in remedy as well as in
definitional coverage)"0 should be reason for a thoughtful second
look at some of the basic propositions and considerations underlying
the securities laws."
5 E.g., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Rustic v. Werblin, CCH
FED. SEc. L REp. 5 91637 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1966) (recognizing fraud-type actions
by buyer based on SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964), the Securities Act,
and state law under pendent jurisdiction).6 E.g., Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (Securities Act §
17 (a), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964); SEC Rule 10b-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964)), wherein the plaintiff was permitted to pursue an action
for damages while still in possession of the purchased securities. The reason given for
finding an independent cause of action under S 17 (a) was that in such an action, "plain-
tiff would not have the advantage of the unusual rule as to burden of proof [defendant
has the burden of proving defense of innocence) created by Section 12." Pfeffer v.
Cressaty, supra at 758; cf. Belhumeur v. Dawson, 229 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mont. 1964).
7 See Pasquesi, The Expanding "Securities" Concept, 49 ILL. B.J. 728 (1961).8 See generally 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 2, at 455-512. The question of which
devices and transactions come within the purview of the state and federal definitions of
"security" has been actively litigated, and there have been many reported decisions in
this area since the 1962 Supplement to Professor Loss' treatise.
9 Indeed, perhaps the day is not far hence when it will be said of the securities laws
as it has been similarly said of heaven, the Internal Revenue Code, and the antitrust
statutes - that "not a sparrow falls without the securities laws nodding their assent."
10 The jurisdictional requirements of the federal securities laws are also being re-
laxed. See, e.g., Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (intra-
state telephone call sufficient jurisdictional basis for applying Securities Act § 5, 48
Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 77e (1964)). Perhaps the federal securities
laws should be described as growing at both ends and in the middle.
1 While the task of determining whether a particular device or agreement is a se-
curity seems a humble one, one blue sky law administrator has recently said that, of all
the securities conundrums, "ascertaining whether a security is involved in a particular
transaction can be the most difficult problem an attorney faces." Newton, A Look at
[VoL 18: 367
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Having noted charily that the widening vistas of remedy tend to
broaden the effects of extending the definitional coverage of the se-
curities laws, this discussion now focuses on the latter problem,
i.e., the issues and analysis involved in determining what transac-
tions should come within the definition of a "security."
B. Framework and Structure of Analysis
The starting points for an examination of the "security" concept
are the definition sections of the federal statutes' 2 and of the state
blue sky laws. 3 These definition statutes typically include a list
of fairly specific and readily identifiable types of devices and ar-
rangements, 4 along with a -group of more general classifications
which tend to be less susceptible of any single meaning. 5 The
courts, counsel, and administrative agencies have long wrestled
with both the specific and the general elements of the definition,
struggling to explicate the essential characteristics of the "security"
concept. It is within the framework of the more recent cases which
the Montana Securities Act and Its Relation to the Federal Securities Act, 26 MONT. L.
REv. 31, 35 (1964).
12 Securities Act § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2)
(1964); Exchange Act § 3(a) (10), 48 Star. 882 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a) (10) (1964); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § 2(a) (16), 49
Stat. 803, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a) (16) (1964); Investment Company Act of
1940, § 2(a) (35), 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (35) '(1964); In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940, § 202(a) (17), 54 Star. 847, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) (17) (1964). The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 303(1), 53
Stat. 1151, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77ccc(1) (1964), adopts the definition of Secur-
ities Act § 2(1), 48 Star. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1964). There
are some minor and some major differences in these definitions, and the discrepancies
will be noted as they become critical to the analysis in the text. Recently promulgated
SEC Rule 3a11-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (Supp. 1966), defining "equity security,"
will have some impact on our subsequent analysis, as will the exemptions found in Se-
curities Act §§ 3-4,48 Star. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c-d (1964).
13 As Professor Loss has indicated, some care must be exercised to note differences
in the specific wording of the various state and federal statutes. 1 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 456. However, the state courts especially have exhibited a remarkable elastic-
ity in following the decisions under the federal acts and the laws of other states. They
appear favorably disposed to discount the significance of the categories listed in the
statutory definition in favor of a more pervasive, and perhaps more meaningful, concept.
This problem will be explored at greater length later in the article.
The definition contained in the UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT § 401 1, 1 BLUE SKY L.
REP. 5 4931 (1958), is very similar to that in the Federal Securities Act. The Uniform
Act has been adopted substantially or in modified form in twenty-one states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 4901 (1965).
S4 E.g., "any note, stock... bond, [or) debenture." Securities Act § 2(1), 48 Stat.
74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964).
15 E.g., "certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement...
transferable shares, investment contract.. . or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security'...." Ibid.
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have construed and applied the definitional provisions of the state
and federal securities laws - in their general 6 and specific aspects
- that this article will conduct its analysis.' The primary goal of
this article is thus to formulate, from a consideration of a number of
recent opinions involving a variety of devices and arrangements,18
a set of analytical tests and guidelines which might be used to de-
termine whether particular transactions involve securities and are
hence the proper subjects of the special regulatory features of the
state and federal securities laws.
First, the basic structure and protections of the securities laws
will be examined in an effort to state, in the most general terms,
the fundamental considerations which should underlie any examina-
tion of the distinguishing features of a security. 9 This is followed
by a discussion of a revered formula which traditionally has been
thought of as accurately setting forth the specific indicia of a se-
curity.2" Then, with some trepidation, there is suggested a more
complete and reliable shorthand description of the essential eco-
nomic realities underlying the "security" concept.2 ' Each element
of the proposed definition is discussed at some length,2 and particu-
lar attention is paid to the problems created when courts and admin-
istrative agencies become too enamored of neat formulas handed
down from prior opinions and fail to focus on the essential economic
considerations relevant to identifying a security. Also explored are
16 Perhaps the most enlightening attempts to enunciate the true nature of a security
are found in cases applying the general provisions of the definition sections, which must
be invoked whenever novel devices or transactions are the subjects of litigation. Cer-
tainly the broad provisions should stimulate the deepest thought on the part of prac-
titioners. "The definition [of 'security'] expressly includes many of the more orthodox
types of securities, and, though patent, even these are sometimes inadvertently 'missed'
(for example, preorganization subscriptions). The definition contains several cate-
gories, however, which can be extremely troublesome, and understandably 'missed.'"
Newton, supra note 11, at 35.
17 It will be necessary, however, to consider certain of the older cases whose holdings
(but not necessarily whose reasoning) will serve as the bedrock of this discussion.
180f primary concern will be such devices as: promissory notes, cooperative apart-
ments, organization memberships, franchises, coin investment agreements, preincor-
poration arrangements, interests in developmental property, interests in productive prop-
erty accompanied by management agreements, limited partnership interests, retail mar-
keting and financing techniques, and a variety of other novel but thought-provoking
transactions. Some notable lacunae in this article are the areas of commingled trusts,
equity-insurance arrangements, managing agency accounts, and mineral interests, al-
though now and then one may catch the scent of crude as the landmark case on oil
leases, SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), is referred to.
19 See text accompanying notes 25-32 infra.
20 See text accompanying notes 33-46 infra.
21 See text accompanying note 47 infra.
22 See text accompanying notes 48-159 infra.
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the distortions introduced by a rigidly literal approach to statutory
interpretation or by an excessive concern for deceptive rules of con-
struction.23 Finally, the issues peculiar to isolated and private trans-
actions are discussed, and possible solutions to some rather difficult
problems of policy and statutory construction are indicated.24
I. ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A "SECURITY":
STATUTES, FORMULAS, AND DECISIONS
A. General Conclusions Derived From Statutory Structure
The state and federal securities laws contain two basic levels of
protection. First, they provide for the full disclosure 5 of registration
or state administrative approval26 whenever the security involved is
not covered by certain exemptive provisions." Second, even if the
exemptive provisions apply so that registration or state approval are
not required, distribution and trading ordinarily remain subject to
several and-fraud and anti-half-truth provisions.2" Generally speak-
ing, the anti-fraud statutes relax the procedural and substantive con-
ditions of relief which are characteristic of the common law and
equitable fraud actions.29 Moreover, they usually carry criminal penal-
ties for their violatione' From these simple observations two im-
portant sets of conclusions can be drawn:
(1) The considerations involved in determining whether a par-
ticular device or transaction is a security are not coextensive with
the considerations used to determine whether full disclosure (by way
23 See text accompanying notes 160-83 infra.
2 4 See text accompanying notes 184-204 infra.
2 5 Securities Act §§ 5-7, 8, 10, 48 Star. 77, 79, 81 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§77e-g, 77h, 77i (1964).
2 6 See, e.g., in the area of state securities regulation, UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT §
304(c), I BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 4924 (1958).
2 7 Securities Act §§ 3-4, 48 Stat 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c-d (1964);
UNIFORM SE cURITIES ACT § 402, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 4932 (1958).
28See Securities Act §§ 12(2), 17(a), 48 Star. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 771(2), 77q(a) (1964); Exchange Act §5 15(c) (1)-(2), 48 Stat. 895 (1934),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(c) (1)-(2) (1964); UNIFORM SECUITIS ACT §§
101, 410(a) (2), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. gg 4902, 4940 (1958); SEC Rule lOb-5, 17
C.I.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964). It is also probably true that the anti-fraud provisions apply
to those transactions which the SEC has exempted in one way or another from registra-
tion. See, e.g., regarding employee benefit plans, Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability
of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 795, 808 nA2, 813-14 (1964). See also SEC Rule 133, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.133 (1964), extending a kind of exemption to certain financial reorganizations.
29 See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1421-44, 1763-97.
3 0 Securities Act § 24, 48 Star. 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964); Exchange Act
§ 32, 48 Stat. 904 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77ff (1964).
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of registration) or administrative approval should be required. This
is evident because the statutes are written so that the residual but
substantial protection of the anti-fraud provisions persists notwith-
standing the applicability of an exemption from registration or state
approval. It is improper to equate the question of whether an ar-
rangement constitutes a security with the question of whether the
registration or approval philosophies should be invoked. To do so
automatically excludes from the definition of "security" those trans-
actions which possess enough troublesome characteristics to require
liberal anti-fraud protection but which also involve enough balanc-
ing safeguards (or few enough additional worrisome characteristics)
to eliminate the need for registration and state approval. For exam-
ple, it cannot be said that an arrangement is not a security just be-
cause it is offered to only a few fully informed and sophisticated
buyers so as to be exempt from registration or state approval.81 By
their structure, the securities laws dearly imply that the features of a
transaction which dictate the requirement for registration or state ap-
proval are distinct from, and in addition to, the criteria employed in
deciding the prior and more basic question of security vel non.2
(2) Although the securities laws are intended to cover more
situations than those in which registration and state administrative
approval are required, they cannot have been meant to embrace all
3 1 See Securities Act § 4(2), 48 Star. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d
(1964). The desirability of transferring some of the standards now used to determine
the availability of exemptions (in particular, the number and character of the offerees) to
the definition sections of the securities statutes will be discussed later in the article.
Such standards would then be used in resolving the first and more basic question of
whether a transaction is a security. See text accompanying notes 184-204 infra.
32 There is a tendency on the part of courts and commentators, when discussing the
criteria for determining whether an arrangement is a security, to state a test which is
improperly couched in terms of whether the arrangement is one in which full disdosure
(by way of registration) or state administrative approval should be required. For ex-
ample, in Pasquesi, supra note 7, at 728, the writer begins his artide on the definition
of security by discussing the disclosure philosophy of the registration provisions of the
Securities Act. See also Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807, cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 903 (1965), in which the court held that no security was involved
within the meaning of the Federal Securities Act and the Illinois Blue Sky Law because,
inter alia, "the protection of the full disclosure afforded by registration is not needed.'
Id. at 234, 204 N.E.2d at 809.
The proclivity to phrase the question of whether a particular transaction is a security
in terms of whether the full disclosure of registration should be required has spawned
some interesting comments on the security aspects of limited partnership interests. It
seems to be the position of some that limited partnership interests should not be deemed
securities at all when they are non-transferable and offered to a cozy little group of
fully informed, though passive investors. See 1 LOSs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 504-06.
Under the present statutory scheme, however, the number and knowledge of the offerees
seem relevant only to the question of whether the sale is a private one and therefore ex-
empt under Securities Act § 4(2), 48 Star. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d
(1964).
[Vol. 18: 367
EXISTENCE OF A "SECURITY"
transactions involving fraud or half-truths. The special prohibitions
against misstatements and material omissions, together with specific
procedures and remedies, constitute a general liberalization of com-
mon law fraud relief and are obviously meant to apply only when
there are special policy justifications for invoking their protection.
Combining the preceding conclusions, the following proposition
may be legitimately derived from an examination of statutory struc-
ture: A "security" is a transaction whose characteristics distinguish it
from the generality of transactions so as to create a need for the
special fraud procedures, protections, and remedies provided by the
securities laws. This proposition may be rephrased in the form of a
"master question" regarding the nature of a security: What charac-
teristics or features of a transaction necessitate its being subject to
the rather specialized anti-fraud protection afforded by the securities
laws? The air has now been cleared by demonstrating that the
inquiry made herein cannot be identified with the question of
whether registration and state administrative approval should be re-
quired. Recognizing, therefore, that the characteristics sought con-
stitute a certain minimum group of elements which are not neces-
sarily sufficient to give rise to a requirement for full disclosure and
approval, an examination of the specific characteristics contained
in the judicially approved formula for identifying a security is in
order.
B. The Howey Formula
In response to the "master question" posed in the preceding dis-
cussion, the Supreme Court of the United States, in SEC v. W. J.
Howey Co.,3" propounded the following formula: "A security 4 is a
transaction . . . whereby [11 a person invests his money [21 in a
common enterprise and [31 is led to expect profits [41 solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party."" This formula has
33 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
34 The Howey case involved the interpretation of the phrase "investment contract"
in Securities Act § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1964).
For now, it will be assumed that the Court's enumeration of the essential characteristics
of an investment contract applies to all the specific and general classifications contained
in the definition sections of the various laws. See statutes cited notes 12-13 supra. The
wisdom of applying an overriding "economic realities" test to all transactions which are
claimed to be securities - even those which come within the literal meaning of words
such as "notes," "stocks," and "bonds"--will be examined later. See text accompany-
ing notes 160-83 infra.
36 328 U.S. at 298-99. Hereinafter, the formula quoted in the text shall be referred
to as the "Howey formula" or the "Howey test."
1967]
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been quoted and purportedly applied in a myriad of federal and state
cases and administrative opinions." It is true that a formula is an
extremely helpful tool when used as a checklist or guideline for
adjudication. However, the formula must be, in the first instance,
the product of an accurate and complete analysis which will lead
to its intelligent application in subsequent, but often differing, fact
patterns.
Although the Howey opinion contains much enlightening dis-
cussion, it seems incomplete or misleading with respect to certain
essential qualities of a security. These shortcomings are, not sur-
prisingly, reflected in the Howey test itself. As a prelude to later
analysis, attention is called to the following points which seem to
render the Howey formula (to use the Court's own adjective) "un-
realistic:""7
(1) The Howey test attenuates (or ignores) the risk of loss of
the original value furnished by the purchaser." This deficiency is
aggravated by the summary and misleading treatment given to the
reasoning of the two lower courts,'9 which stressed the fact that the
buyer had received, in exchange for his initial value, tangible prop-
erty with an intrinsic value not dependent on the success of any
enterprise - a circumstance which bears directly on the buyer's risk
of losing the value which he originally furnished."
(2) The words "common enterprise" are particularly ambigu-
ous, having a wide range of possible meanings,41 and tend to fog
36United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 999 (1966); Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 824 (1961); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 925 (1954); SEC v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81, 82 (E.D.
Mass. 1962); Emery v. So-Soft, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120, 123 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964).87 
"The statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors is not to be
thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae." 328 U.S. at 301.
3 8 Throughout this article, the phrase "original value furnished by the purchaser"
will often be referred to simply as "original value," "initial value," or "initial invest-
ment." These terms relate to the money, property, or services furnished by the alleged
"buyer" to the alleged "seller" in the first step of the purported "security" transaction.
The term "buyer" will be used to refer to the would-be purchaser of the purported se-
curity - the one who furnishes the initial value. "Seller" relates to the one who re-
ceives the initial value.
39 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 60 F. Supp. 440, 442 (S.D. Fla.), ard, 151 F.2d 714,
717 (5th Cit. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
40
"We reject the suggestion of the Circuit Court ... that [a security] ... is neces-
sarily missing where.., the tangible interest which is sold has intrinsic value indepen-
dent of the success of the enterprise as a whole." 328 U.S. at 301. (Emphasis added.)
This subject is worthy of closer scrutiny; the qualifying adverb "necessarily" probably
saves the statement from being harmful dictum. See text accompanying notes 92-94
infra.
41 Some possible "common enterprise" situations are those in which each of the par-
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rather than to clarify the central issues involved in identifying a
security.
(3) Emphasis is placed on the inducement of future "profits."
The criticism here is twofold. First, attention is focused on the
promise of future profits and drawn away from the risk of imme-
diate loss of initial investment. Second, the word "profits" presents
some troublesome problems of interpretation. 2
It is a major contention of this article that risk to initial in-
vestment, though not determinative, is the single most important
economic characteristic which distinguishes a security from the uni-
verse of other transactions. It is further submitted that the courts
and administrative bodies have placed too little emphasis on the
danger of loss of original value, while placing too much emphasis
on the inducement of future profits.3 The numerous manifesta-
tions of risk to initial investment" have not been adequately recog-
I
ticipants owns: (1) a percentage interest in the assets or entity of an enterprise, it being
understood that he will receive a share of profits and that his original value shall bear
a share of enterprise losses; (2) a claim against the enterprise, calling for return of his
original value plus interest in scheduled payments, fixed or variable, related or unrelated
to profits; (3) specific property employed or used by an enterprise, with each owner
receiving a percentage share of the profits derived from the use of all such property -
the percentage share being based on the ratio of the value of each owner's property to
the total value of all such property; (4) the same facts as were listed in the third situa-
tion but with each owner receiving the net profits derived from his specific property;
and (5) property not described in (1)-(4), the present value of which has been
determined by taking into account the anticipated but unrealized success of the enterprise.
The foregoing are simply various ways in which money or property can be subjected
to the risks of an enterprise. On the one extreme, the words "common enterprise"
could be taken to convey the notion that the values furnished by investors must be sub-
ject to all the risks of an enterprise, pro rata, e.g., by means of percentage shares in the
enterprise assets or entity, where there is a pro rata division of the pooled gains and losses
of all operations, giving some of the flavor of "common" stock. On the other hand,
these words might simply be meant to describe situations in which the values furnished
by investors are in some way subject to the risks of the same enterprise.
The adjective "common" also connotes plurality and poses the problem of whether
there must be a minimum number of investors in the enterprise. The issues generated
by the phrase are certainly fraught with fine distinctions which perhaps need not be
drawn after more material but less complicated questions have been resolved.
4 The initial inquiry is whether the reference point of profitability is the buyer's
initial investment or the overall operations of the risk enterprise. This question becomes
critical when the buyer is led to expect a return over and above his initial investment,
whether or not the enterprise has profits. A further question is whether a fixed rate
or amount of return comes within the notion of "profits." Finally, do "profits" include
unrealized appreciation or nonpecuniary benefits?
4 3 While the bulk of the decisions are probably correct on their facts, it is felt that
their reasoning has been inaccurate or' misleading, creating the danger of improper ad-
judication in the future.
44 See note 41 supra. However, the essential element of risk of loss of original value
may be coming abruptly into its own. See Note, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 156 (1962); Note,
14 HASTINGS LJ. 181 (1962). Californians seem to have been jolted a bit by the
1967]
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nized, and the much discussed element of expected "profits" has
itself been misunderstood. In short, it is felt that the answer to the
"1master question" has not been fully and accurately answered by
the Howey test or its underlying analysis.
The prinicipal teaching of Howey is that, in the process of identi-
fying a security, "form [is] ... disregarded for substance and emphasis
[is] ... placed upon economic reality."45 This short mandate yields
two important lessons, one regarding statutory interpretation and
the other concerning the kind of qualities which distinguish a se-
curity from the generality of transactions. Taking these topics in
reverse order, the discussion now proceeds to a tentative statement
of this author's own formula or checklist describing the economic
realities underlying the "security" concept.46
C. Statement of the Economic Realities of a eSecurity"
The master question of this inquiry has been previously posited:
What characteristics or features of a transaction necessitate its being
subject to the rather specialized anti-fraud protection afforded by
the securities laws? The Howey test has enjoyed the acceptance and
approval of courts and agencies for twenty years. The function of
this article is not to swim against the stream of past analysis, but
rather to widen it here, narrow it there, and perhaps shift its course
in various places. It is submitted that the following test states the
essential economic characteristics which distinguish a security from
the generality of transactions so as to create a need for the liberal
procedures, protections, and remedies provided by the securities laws
against fraud and half-truths.
court's heavy emphasis on risk to initial investment in Silver Hills Country Club v. So-
bieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
45 328 U.S. at 298.
46 In text accompanying note 47 infra, a formula will be offered stating the "eco-
nomic realities" which are, it is contended, the essential characteristics of a "security."
In text accompanying notes 48-159 infra, the proposed formula will be discussed in the
context of a number of recent opinions in order to test the validity of its underlying
analysis. The opinions occasionally manifest wayward reasoning, some of which seems
to have been induced by the ambiguities of the Howey test, however, it will also appear
that the adjudicators themselves have not been found wanting in their ability to intro-
duce a variety of red herring. Text accompanying notes 160-83 infra will treat of the
necessity of making the "economic realities" test a pervasive one, i.e., one which would
be controlling even when certain transactions come within the literal meaning of the
readily identifiable classifications listed in the definitional statutes. Finally, text accom-
panying notes 184-204 infra focuses on some of the special problems created by isolated
and private transactions and suggests some ways in which such transactions should be
treated in the light of present statutory language and its implications.
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A "security" is:
(1) A transaction 47 in which
(2) a person ("buyer") furnishes value ("initial value") to
another ("seller"); and
(3) a portion of initial value is subjected to the risks of an en-
terprise, it being sufficient if -
(a) part of initial value is furnished for a proprietary in-
terest in, or debt-holder claim against, the enterprise,
or
(b) any property received by the buyer is committed to
use by the enterprise, even though the buyer retains
specific ownership of such property, or
(c) part of initial value is furnished for property whose
present value is determined by taking into account
the anticipated but unrealized success of the en-
terprise, even though the buyer has no legal rela-
tionship with the enterprise; and
(4) at the time of the transaction, the buyer is not familiar
with the operations of the enterprise or does not receive
the right to participate in the management of the enter-
prise; and
(5) the furnishing of initial value is induced by the seller's
promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable
understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over
and above initial value, will accrue to the buyer as a result
of the operation of the enterprise.
The foregoing statement reiterates the Howey test in some re-
spects, but the essence of the "new look" is found particularly in
the third and fourth paragraphs which highlight the troublesome
prospect that the buyer's original value could dwindle because of
the failure of an enterprise over which he exercises no control.
The phrase "common enterprise" has been abandoned because
it implies that the buyer must receive a proprietary share in the
enterprise with the understanding that his initial investment will
bear its share of overall enterprise losses. As will be demonstrated,
risk to initial investment can take several other forms. Moreover,
there seems to be no requirement that there be any minimum num-
ber of buyers (or offerees), as the word "common" tends to imply.
Another general departure from the Howey formula is the
wording "benefits of some kind, over and above initial value" in-
stead of the term "profits." It will be seen that the expectation of
fixed amounts or rates of return (related or unrelated to the profits
reflected on the income statement of the enterprise), appreciation
47 At text accompanying notes 184-204 infra, there is a discussion of the advisability
of adding the following limitation after the word "transaction": "except an isolated
transaction not involving an offering to the public."
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in value, or even non-pecuniary benefits in excess of initial value
should be sufficient to satisfy the profit inducement requirement.
The following discussion is an attempt to demonstrate the ana-
lytical approach by which the proposed "economic realities" test for
identifying a security can be applied to the recent cases.
D. Analysis of the 'Economic Realities" Test in the Context of
Recent Decisions
(1) A Transaction.-As used in the test for identifying a se-
curity, the term "transaction" has a broad meaning indeed. It
describes a concatenation of separate but related events, such as
transfers of money and property, written promises, oral promises
and representations, and even surrounding circumstances. All oc-
currences and events which can, in a broad sense, be properly con-
sidered as part of one bargain are welded together into one legally
significant event for securities law purposes.
The ordinary transaction involves the transfer of money or prop-
erty by the buyer in exchange for a written promise of some kind
from the seller. However, a "transaction" may also consist of the
transfer of initial value by the buyer, the buyer's receipt of an inter-
est in specific real property, and the seller's representation that a
developmental project nearby might cause an increase in the value
of the buyer's interest.4" A transfer of value by the buyer, the
receipt of specific property in return, and the execution of an agree-
ment giving the seller49 or a third party"0 management control over
the property may also comprise a single transaction.
4 8 SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). The Court noted that
"security" transactions are generally in documentary form but sometimes include sur-
rounding circumstances. See Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961) : "By its very nature, it is the peculiar facts of the setting
which turn the offer from a mere sale of property into a sale of a security." Id. at 440.
(Emphasis added.)
49SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d
690 (5th Cir. 1953), petition for cert. dismissed per curiam, 347 U.S. 925 (1954);
SEC v. Great W. Land & Dev., Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91537 (D. Ariz. 1965)
(Transfer Binder 1964-1966), rev'd on other grounds, 355 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1966)
(buyer purchased an undivided beneficial interest in a specific parcel of land and agreed
that the seller should have power to list and sell the real estate); Sarmento v. Arbax
Packing Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 421, 41 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Dist. Ct App. 1964), involving
the sale of a growing grape crop together with an agreement that the seller would care
for and market the grapes. The court considered the sale of the grapes together with
the marketing and care agreement but held the combination did not constitute a "se-
curity." Op. Fla. Att'y Gen., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70653 (Dec. 14, 1964).
50 SEC v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1962). "The fact that
... [the] third party [who takes management control of the property received by the
buyer] may be legally distinct from the [seller of the property] ... does not bring the
activity outside the coverage of [the Securities Act] .... " Id. at 83.
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The buyer's transfer of initial value has also been viewed in
combination with: the seller's oral promises; written and oral
promises and representations by the seller;52 the transfer of a fran-
chise to the buyer, accompanied by the oral representations of the
seller;53 negotiable instruments plus the seller's oral representations
and promises;54 the transfer of a distributorship franchise to the
buyer, followed by the buyer's purchase of tangible property for re-
sale, coupled with an arrangement to have the seller do the reselling
on a commission basis; 5 written "receipts" plus representations of
the seller;56 sales of consumer goods to the buyer for more than fair
market value, accompanied by the oral and written representations
and promises of the seller;5" transfers of intangible property to the
buyer together with oral and written agreements and representations
regarding the seller's management of the intangibles; or written
51 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70691 (Nov. 12, 1965) (oral part-
nership interests).
5 2 SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961) (promissory notes and
vague representations regarding buyer's future share in the success of the enterprise);
People v. Smith, 180 Cal. App. 2d 420, 4 CaL Rptr. 282 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (prom-
issory notes and understandings that stock would be issued to replace notes). The notes
would have been exempt under California law, but the court found that the whole tran-
saction was an offer of stock. Id. at 425, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
0 Drug Management, Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. RE3P. 5 91293
(D.D.C. 1963). The court, in holding that no "security" was involved, viewed a fran-
chise agreement and the seller's representations as one transaction.
54 United States v. Attaway, 211 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. La. 1962) (loans by plaintiff
in exchange for checks, accompanied by defendant's oral promises and representations
regarding payment of interest).
55 UnitedStates v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964), cart. denied, 382 U.S. 999
(1965). The plaintiff purchased the right to distribute the defendant's products. The
plaintiff subsequently purchased goods from the defendant for resale; however, since
the plaintiff was not in the position to do the reselling himself, he commissioned the
defendant to resell the products for him.
56 Polikoff v. Levy, 55 I1. App. 2d 229, 204 NXE.2d 807, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903
(1965). The seller disseminated letters describing a motel venture and gave "tenta-
tive receipts" for the initial value furnished by the buyer.
5 7 Pennsylvania Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY
L. REP. 5 70631 (Pa. C.P. 1963), affd, 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964), wherein
a vacuum cleaner was sold to the plaintiff for an inflated price and the seller promised
the plaintiff a certain sum for every cleaner sold to persons recommended by the plain-
tiff. Considering all the circumstances, it was held that there was no "security." -Ibid.
Emery v. So-Soft, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964) (overcharge for water
softener with referral agreement; held, no "security"); Yoder v. So-Soft, Inc., 202 N.E.2d
329 (Ohio C.P. 1963) (overcharge for water softener with referral agreement, held,
a "security"). Cf. Fidelity Credit Co. v. Bradford, 177 So. 2d 635 (La. Ct. App.), ap-
peal denied, 248 La. 430, 179 So. 2d 273 (1965) (vacuum cleaner plus referral agree-
ment; overcharge not dear).
58Farrell v. United States, 321 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
992 (1964). Farrell involved the sale of trust deed and mortgage notes (or interests
therein) to buyers, together with management and service contracts. For details of facts,
see the related opinion in Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 264 F.2d
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promises of the seller plus the written promises of a third party."
Oral unilateral offers of payment for services have also been found
to be transactions eligible for security classification."
It is abundantly dear, then, that the term "transaction," as used
in the suggested test for identifying a security, is a collective one.
Prior to analyzing a transaction for its security characteristics, the
courts and agencies determine the dimensions of the transaction by
integrating separate but related transfers, agreements, representa-
tions, and surrounding circumstances.6 The significance of this
practice lies in its effect on subsequent steps of the analytical process.
As the content of a transaction is expanded to include more events
and circumstances, there is a correspondingly greater chance of find-
ing that the transaction possesses all of the essential characteristics
of a security. In other words, by conglomerating a number of
events into a composite transaction, the courts and agencies have
often facilitated the task of finding that the transaction is endowed
with all the distinguishing features of a security. Those qualities
will now be considered seriatim as they appear in the proposed for-
mula.
(2) Furnishing of Initial Value.--Of course, value can be fur-
nished in the form of money, property,"2 or services."3 Once value
has been furnished by the buyer, a number of events may follow,
including the transfer of tangible property from the seller to the
buyer. At first blush it might appear as though the buyer, having
received specific tangible value in return, can no longer claim that
any part of his initial value is still invested. The fact that the buyer
receives tangible property in return for his value may signal the
need for unusually careful analysis, but it by no means precludes the
199, 202-03 n.3 (9th Cir. 1959). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 3892, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 76559 (Jan. 31, 1958); Op. Cal. Att'y Gen., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
5 70383 (May 23, 1958).
59 Bellerue v. Business Files Institute, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 488, 393 P.2d 401, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (1964). Corporation A agreed to sell stock in corporation B to the buyer in
exchange for the buyer's loans to corporation B. Corporation B executed its notes pay-
able to the buyer in the amount of the loans. The notes would have been exempt, but
the combination of steps was an investment contract.
60 SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961).
61 Some recounts of relevant surrounding circumstances read very much like trav-
elogues. See Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Nicewarner v. Bleav-
ins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965).
2 jackson v. Robertson, 90 Ariz. 405, 368 P.2d 645 (1962); State v. Davis, 131
N.W.2d 730 (N.D. 1964) (buyer exchanged stock for notes).
63 SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961).
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possibility that the whole transaction "' constitutes a security. Even
if the buyer receives tangible property in exchange for his original
value, the question is still whether the transaction exhibits the "eco-
nomic realities" of a security. In the proposed test, one of the most
important economic characteristics of a security is the fact that the
buyer's initial investment is somehow, considering the effects of the
entire transaction, subjected to the risks of an enterprise. The dis-
cussion now passes to an analysis of the risk issue.
(3) Risk of Loss of Initial Value.-Risk of loss of initial value
is an essential attribute of a security. This proposition can be traced
to the most prestigious of sources. Although not often cited, the
following language constitutes the core of Mr. Justice Jackson's
rationale in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.:
It is clear that an economic interest in this [enterprise] . .. was
what brought into being the instruments [evidencing real property
interests] that defendants were selling and gave to the instruments
most of their value and all of their lure. The trading in these
[interests) ... had all the evils inherent in the securities transac-
tions which it was the aim of the Securities Act to end.66
Without the enterprise, there would be no value to anyone's real
property interest.
The Court's concern is dearly focused on the relationship be-
tween the success of the enterprise and the preservation or deteriora-
tion of the value which the buyer originally furnished in the alleged
security transaction. The fact that the buyer would have been left
without "any value" if the enterprise had failed made it crystal clear
that the initial value furnished by the buyer was subject to the risks
of the enterprise. The fate of the buyer's initial investment was
tied to the success of the venture, a circumstance which the Court
considered critically relevant to the need for securities law protec-
tion.
Joiner isolated the element of risk to initial value as one of the
essential features of a "security." While it has been said that
Howey was a clarification of Joiner," one wonders whether the
64 A1 the constituent elements of the transaction must be considered. See text ac-
companying notes 48-61 supra.
65 320 U.S. 344 (1943). The following passage is more frequently cited:
Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also
reached [by the federal securities laws] if it be proved as a matter of fact that
they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which
established their character in commerce as . .. "any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security."' Id. at 351.
661d. at 349. (Emphasis added.)
67 Pasquesi, The Expanding "Securities" Concept, 49 ILL. B.J. 728 (1961).
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Howey formula's shift in emphasis - from risk of initial value to
the expectation of future profits - is faithful to Mr. Justice Jack-
son's penetrating analysis in Joiner.6" Many state and federal opin-
ions have cited both Supreme Court cases, 9 but the risk of loss
notion articulated in Joiner has not been stressed nearly as much as
the Howey formula with its heavy emphasis on the expectation of
future profits.
Perhaps a renaissance of the risk factor is developing, however.
A recent federal decision, SEC v. Latta,7" and a state decision, Silver
Hills Country Club v. Sobieski," contain explicit language recog-
nizing risk to initial investment as an essential characteristic of a
security. In the Latta case, the court observed: "Unless the de-
fendant is successful in [her enterprise] ... the contracts [sold to the
buyers] will remain scraps of worthless paper."72  In deciding the
"crucial question" of whether the transaction at bar came within the
"regulatory purpose" of the securities laws, the Silver Hills court
isolated the risk to the buyer's initial investment as the most impor-
tant aspect of the transaction.7
6 8 Mr. Justice Jackson did not take part in the Howey decisions.
6 9 E.g., Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824
(1961); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), petition for cert. dis-
missed per curiam, 347 U.S. 925 (1954); SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D.
Tex. 1961); Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 809 (1965), cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 903 (1965).
70250 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 356 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 940 (1966). Estelle Latta, undaunted by the passage of time
and the policies of the law disfavoring endless litigation, continues her campaign to
cause a redistribution of the estate of Mark Hopkins, who shuffled off this mortal coil
more than eighty years ago. To finance her endeavor, she sold, for one hundred dollars
each, assignments of 1/21,000 of any redistribution that she might obtain. It is not
dear from the opinion how much gain was expected to accrue to the purchasers of these
fractional interest assignments, but one thing was certain: Unless Estelle Latta was at
least partially successful, the money paid for these unlikely instruments would, as far as
the hapless buyers were concerned, join Mr. Hopkins in the great beyond.
7155 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). The promotor of a
country dub sold initial memberships for substantial sums. The proceeds were used to
finance completion of dub facilities and other organizational expenditures. Purchasers
of memberships received no interest in the assets or profits of the dub but were granted
only the right to use the facilities of the club when it was completed. Thus, while the
profits expected by the buyers were difficult to identify and assess, it was dearly possible
that, if the seller failed to complete the dub, a substantial part of the buyers' purchase
value would dissipate forthwith in the manner so vividly portrayed by those fleeting
little money bags with wings which appear in the cartoons.
72250 F. Supp. at 173. (Emphasis added.) The risk that has been discussed
at this point in the article is simply the risk that the buyer's original investment will
become worthless or worth less. "This is a situation in which the economic welfare of
investors is 'inextricably woven' with the ability of the promoter to carry out [the en-
terprise] .... " Id. at 173.
73 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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These cases represent no shockingly new analytical approach to
identifying a security, as some would seem to think.74 They are
true to highly respectable judicial attitudes, such as those in Joiner.
There could be a deceptively obvious reason why many opinions
(including Howey75) have taken the different tack of placing princi-
pal emphasis on the fact that the buyer was led to expect future
profits. First, risk to initial value is generally accompanied by
promises or representations which cause the buyer to expect a rather
dearly identifiable sort of pecuniary profits in the future.76 Second,
it seems true that the buyer's reasonable expectation of future profits
is often somewhat easier to detect than the element of risk to initial
investment, as will be seen. The combination of these two phe-
nomena may account for the bias of the decisions in favor of adopt-
ing the expectation of future profits as the most significant factor
in identifying a security.7
In any event, while it may be generally harmless, and often
more convenient, to gloss over the risk characteristic, there are at
least two situations in which this sort of imperfect analysis will lead
to improper results:
(1) In some cases, the profits expected by the buyer may be
difficult to identify and assess; this would be especially true if the
term "profits" were construed narrowly to mean only a share of the
internal net profits shown on the income statement of an enter-
prise." At the same time, there may be a serious risk of loss of
initial investment. If the pivotal issue is whether there is a reason-
able expectation of future profits, the transaction may be excluded
from security classification because the adjudicator is uneasy about
the precise nature of the profits expected. It is submitted that such
a resolution would be erroneous and inconsistent with the purposes
of the securities laws. Substantial determinative weight should be
attached to the factor of risk to initial investment. Where the evi-
dence to support a reasonable expectation of future profits is tenu-
ous or difficult to interpret, the presence of risk to original value
should be examined carefully and employed as a complementary
factor to determine the result.79
74 See, e.g., Note, 14 HASTINGS UJ. 181-82 (1962).
7 5 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
76 See Note, 50 CALIF. L REv. 156, 159 (1962).
77See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
78 This is the issue previewed in note 42 supra. It will be discussed later at greater
length. See text accompanying notes 146-59 infra.
79 The California authorities seem ready to adopt this view. See Sobieski, Securities
Regulation in California: Recent Developments, 11 U.CLAL. REv. 1, 7-8 (1963).
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(2) On the contrary, however, a transaction may be replete
with promises and representations which amply support the buyer's
reasonable expectation of future profits, but the effect of the trans-
action may not be to subject any of the buyer's initial value to the
risks of an enterprise.
The foregoing observations lead naturally into the next item of
discussion, which is an investigation of the various ways in which
the buyer's initial investment can be subjected to the risks of an
enterprise.
(a) Manifestations of Risk.-Subparagraphs (3) (a), (b),
and (c) of the proposed formula0 are shorthand and highly general-
ized descriptions of the basic ways in which the buyer's initial invest-
ment can be subjected to the risks of an enterprise. In testing for
the net effect of a transaction on the buyer's initial value, the eco-
nomic significance of each constituent event of the whole transaction
must be carefully assessed. In some transactions, the element of
risk is easily isolated; in others, the risk is more subtle and more
difficult to identify with precision.81 Most adjudicators, sensing the
presence of a sufficiently troublesome degree of risk to original
value, either fail to analyze the danger of loss further or merely
advert to it in the most general terms. While the decisions usually
reach a correct result without close and accurate scrutiny of the risk
factor, they are, by reason of their deficiencies in this respect, con-
siderably less valuable as precedent.8"
In the interest of explicating the various forms in which risk is
manifested, there follows a detailed analysis of a number of the
specific mechanics by which the buyer's initial value can be sub-
jected to the risks of an enterprise. Each subheading will indicate
the kind of property which the buyer receives in exchange for his
initial investment, and the relationship, if any, created between the
buyer and the risk enterprise.
(i) Intangible Proprietary Interest in the Enterprise: Re-
payment Upon Termination Plus Share of Profits and Losses.-
8 0 These subparagraphs appear at the text following note 47 supra.
81 Some mention was made of these problems in note 41 supra.
82 "It has been said that there should be no hard and fast rule by which to determine
whether that which is offered to a purchaser is [a security] ... since such a determina-
tion would act as a guide post in the aid of the unscrupulous in circumventing the law."
Commonwealth ex rel. Pa. Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414
Pa. 253, 255, 199 A.2d 428, 429 (1964), affirming 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. a 70631 (Pa.
C.P. 1963). While the quoted passage is undoubtedly correct in its statement regard-
ing the desirability of rigid rules, no concern for keeping offerors guessing should stul-
tify the development of a rational analytical approach (together with some shorthand
guidelines) for appraising the "security" aspects of a transaction.
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These are the transactions in which the purchaser receives a proprie-
tary interest in the enterprise. He has a percentage share of the
enterprise assets or, entity, but he also understands that his initial
investment will bear a percentage share of enterprise losses.83 Here-
after, such arrangements will be referred to as "percentage-share" or
"proprietary-interest" transactions. Under such arrangements, the
buyer's initial value is placed at the risk of the business enterprise
in the most unequivocal way, in that he places his initial value at
the disposal of the enterprise in exchange for a proprietary interest.84
The initial investment flows into the stream of general enterprise
capital and becomes fully exposed pro rata to all of the failures of
operations, often serving more or less (depending on the particular
agreement) as a shield or cushion for creditors. Upon termination
of the enterprise, the buyer has no claim if his original value has
been wiped out by deficits.
Thus, whenever the buyer receives, in exchange for his initial
value, a proprietary interest in the enterprise, the presence of risk to
his original investment is rather easy to detect.
(ii) Intangible Claim Against the Enterprise: Creditor's
Right To Receive Repayment and Interest.-Here the buyer relin-
quishes specific ownership of his initial investment and takes in re-
turn a creditor's intangible claim against the enterprise.85 The ini-
tial investment merges into the general enterprise capital, just as it
does in the proprietary interest arrangement. Unlike the buyer of
a percentage share, however, the purchaser does not agree to bear
the losses of the enterprise pro rata, and his value is usually to be
83 Stock; preorganization certificates and subscriptions: Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d
374 (10th Cir. 1965); Iennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964);
Jackson v. Robertson, 90 Ariz. 405, 368 P.2d 645 (1962); People v. Smith, 180 Cal.
App. 2d 420, 4 Cal. Rptr. 282 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960). See also Bellerue v. Business
Files Institute, Inc, 61 Cal. 2d 488, 393 P.2d 401, 39 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964); Donovan
v. Dixon, 261 Minn. 455, 113 N.W.2d 432 (1962) (guaranty fund certificates).
Partnership interests; investment units: Smith v. Sherman, 206 Cal. App. 2d 93, 23
Cal. Rptr. 487 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Rivlin v. Levine, 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 587 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Conroy v. Schultz, 194 A.2d 20 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1963); Op. Nev. Atr'y Gen., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70691 (Nov. 12, 1965).
84 Under the partnership and corporate forms, the buyer's ownership in specific
property is severed, and he takes an interest in the factitious business entity. In joint
adventures or other informal enterprise organizations, the buyer may furnish specific
property in which he retains an ownership interest. However, vis-a-vis outsiders dealing
with the venture, the property is considered a capital contribution and bears its share of
enterprise losses, without the buyer's being able to assert his ownership interest against
such outsiders.
85 United States v. Attaway, 211 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. La. 1962) (checks with
seller's agreement to pay interest if not cashed); State v. Davis, 131 N.W.2d 730
(N.D. 1964) (6 year notes). See also SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (ND.
Tex. 1961) (loan notes).
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returned according to a schedule, whether or not the enterprise has
suffered losses.
In some cases, there is sufficient junior percentage-share-type
investment to absorb losses before they erode the enterprise assets to
a point where the creditor's original investment is jeopardized.
Holders of debt may not always be so fortunate, however, since not
all enterprises are financially structured to include percentage-share
junior investment,8 8 and those which are may provide only a thin
cushion for creditors.
In short, the original value furnished in a debt transaction may
be somewhat more protected from the ravages of enterprise failure
than is the value furnished for a proprietary interest. A secured
debt is merely farther removed from the front lines of risk, for fail-
ure of the enterprise is as likely to take its toll of the property
securing the debt as it is the rest of the assets.
It seems safe to say, then, that there is a significant degree of
risk to initial value furnished in exchange for debt obligations.
(iii) Tangible or Intangible Property: Buyer Retains Spe-
cific Ownership but Recommits Property to Use or Employment by
the Enterprise.-In such a transaction, the buyer receives an interest
in specific property. Such interest may have a present fair market
value, independent of the future success of an enterprise,87 equal
to the original value furnished by the buyer.8 8  The critical com-
ponent of the transaction is the fact that the buyer, while retaining
ownership of the specific property, immediately recommits it for use
or employment by an enterprise. The vehicle by which the property
is recommitted to the enterprise is often a management or service
agreement. The property received and recommitted by the buyer
may be tangible" or intangible."0 The enterprise to which the
8 6 Individuals may operate the enterprise with capital derived solely from the is-
suance of debt. See Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 923 (1954); United States v. Monjar, 47 F. Supp. 421 (D. Del.
1942), afI'd, 147 F.2d 916 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 859 (1944). See also
SEC v. Addison, supra note 85.
87 Payment of initial value in recognition of the yet unrealized success of an enter-
prise is discussed in text accompanying notes 102-10 infra.
88The transaction may differ in this respect from the "overcharge" situations dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 111-18 infra.
89 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); United States v. Herr, 338
F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 999 (1966) (buyer purchased goods
at wholesale and commissioned seller to resell at retail); SEC v. Great W. Land & Dev.,
Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91537 (D. Ariz. 1965) (Transfer Binder 1964-1966),
rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 355 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1966) (buyer received
interest in real property but agreed to let seller list and sell it); SEC v. Willoughby
Coin Exch., CCH FED. SEC L REP. 5 91355 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (coin collection man-
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property is recommitted need not be that of the seller of the prop-
erty.9
1
The principal objection to dassifying such transactions as securi-
ties seems to stem from the fact that the buyer may receive property
with an independent present market value equal to the original
value furnished. If the buyer takes a full quid pro quo, how can he
be said to have placed any value at the risk of an enterprise? This
is the question which was raised by the two lower courts in SEC v.
W. J. Howey Co.,92 and to which the Supreme Court responded
tersely: "We reject the suggestion ... that [a security] ... is neces-
sarily missing where the .. . tangible interest which is sold has
intrinsic value independent of the success of the enterprise as a
whole." 3  The word "necessarily" is critical, for it is doubtful
whether the Court would have applied its holding to some simple
variants of the Howey facts. For example, B purchases crop-pro-
ducing property from S, who has vigorously expounded the profits
to be made from working the land. B then shops around for some-
one to manage his land and later signs a land service contract with
a third party. The theory of Howey would not seem to be appo-
site. B's original value was not subjected to the risks of an enter-
agement); SEC v. Comstock Coin Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91414 (D. Nev.
1964) (Transfer Binder 1964-1966) (coin collection management); SEC v. Orange
Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1962) (sale of land with development and
management contract); Op. Fla. Att'y Gen., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70653 (Dec. 14,
1964) (land with management contract).
90 United States v. Herr, sapra note 89 (franchise entrusted to another for ex-
ploitation); Farrell v. United States, 321 F.2d 409 (9th Cit. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 992 (1964) (sale of mortgage notes with management contract); Los Angeles
Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC. 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 919 (1961) (another stage of the Farrell litigation); SEC Securities Act Release
No. 3892, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 76559 (Jan. 31, 1958) (mortgage note servic-
ing); Op. Cal. At'y Gen., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70383 (May 23, 1958).
Of course, the intangible which is sold to the buyer may itself constitute aL security
without being recommitted to an enterprise. In Farrell v. United States, supra, the de-
fendant purchased individual makers' notes and resold them to the public with service
contracts. The first question is whether the notes were securities, either at the time of
the making or as redistributed by the defendant. The second question is whether the
transaction, consisting of the sale of the notes together with the management contract,
was a security. See Op. Cal. Att'y Gen., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70250 (Dec. 29, 1954).
The question of whether an isolated and private promissory note is a security at the
time of making will be discussed later. See text accompanying notes 184-204 infra.
9 1 SEC v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1962).
92 60 F. Supp. 440, 442 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 151 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd,
328 U.S. 293 (1946). See also SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1941),
wherein the court noted that "contracts for the sale and purchase of a tangible and iden-
tifiable commodity, title to and possession of which passes to the purchaser, are not
ordinarily regarded as [securities]." Id. at 650.
93 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). (Emphasis added.)
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prise in a series of steps which can reasonably be treated as a single
integrated transaction. In other words, the troublesome risk to B's
original investment must arise from the fact that, even though he
receives property of equal value, he immediately recommits it to the
risks of an enterprise as part of the same transaction. The net
effect is similar to that of the one-step transaction, in which theinitial value itself becomes part of the capital of an enterprise and
in which the buyer, instead of receiving an interest in specific prop-
erty distinct from the enterprise, takes a proprietary interest or
debt-holder's claim. 4
The similarity is not complete, however, for the species of risk is
distinctly different from that in transactions where the initial invest-
ment flows into the general capital of the enterprise. Here, al-
though his assets are in some sense "employed in the enterprise,""5
the buyer retains ownership of specific property which is not sub-
ject directly to the internal operating losses of the enterprise. Nev-
ertheless, the buyer's property is subject to various other operational
hazards of the enterprise. For instance, if the buyer's property were
productive crop land and the enterprise managing it became defunct
while the crops were growing, the damage might be so serious that
both the crop and a part of the intrinsic value of the land (repre-
senting initial investment) would be lost. " It might be argued that
the person who has owned land for some time undertakes the same
risk when he turns the land over to a management enterprise.°
The answer to this contention seems to be that, in the latter case,
94 In United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
999 (1966), the buyer furnished initial value to the seller for a distributorship fran-
chise. He then furnished additional value to the seller for goods at wholesale. As part
of the transaction, he agreed to have the seller resell the goods through the seller's fa-
cilities. Thus, the buyer purchased and recommitted both intangible and tangible prop-
erty. In assessing the net effect of the entire transaction, the court stated: "[RJ egard-
less of the statement in the agreement... that the relationship created... was that of
vendor and purchaser, we construe it to be ... [a security]." Id. at 610.
95 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). One way of describing
the difference in risk would be to distinguish between the cases where the initial value
is used in the enterprise (see text accompanying notes 83-86 supra) and cases where
property is received in exchange for initial value and is then recommitted for use by an
enterprise.
96 The risk is greater where the management enterprise may sell the property. E.g.,
SEC v. Comstock Coin Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REi. 91414 (D. Nev. 1964) (Transfer
Binder 1964-1966).
97 As long as the landowner did not pay more than fair market value for the man-
agement services and did not contribute his land as capital in a joint venture with the
management enterprise, it is doubtful that such a transaction would be considered a se-
curity, no matter what kind of lavish promises of fabulous profits were made by the
management enterprise.
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the owner of the land has not, as part of the same transaction, made
a new investment by parting with cash or one kind of property in
exchange for a new kind of property. The securities laws are con-
cerned mainly with protecting the buyer when he exchanges what
he already has for something new.
The risk arising where property is received and immediately re-
committed to an enterprise does not depend on the size or quantity
of the property. The small size or quantity of property may tend to
explain why it was recommitted, for the property may be so small
that it cannot be economically exploited except in conjunction with
other similar property. Once the property is placed under the con-
trol of an enterprise, however, the risk is the same whether the prop-
erty could have been productively employed or managed by the
buyer or not. The Howey opinion, by stressing the small size of the
tracts of crop-growing land sold to the buyer in that case, seemed to
indicate that small size is a sine qua non of risk to initial value. 8
Indeed, some courts have interpreted Howey as holding that small
size is a necessary condition for a security finding." However,
other cases, involving larger quantities of property, have found that
a security was involved,00 apparently on the theory that once the
98 SECv. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). "Indeed, individual de-
velopment of the plots of land... would seldom be economically feasible due to their
small size. Such tracts gain utility ... only when cultivated and developed as compon-
ent parts of a larger area." Id. at 300.
99 E.g., Sarmento v. Arbax Packing Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 421, 41 Cal. Rptr. 869(Dist. Ct. App. 1964), wherein the buyer purchased eighty acres of growing grapes.
The buyer agreed to bear the risk of loss while the crops were growing and to take re-
sponsibility for harvesting. The seller agreed to care for the crop while it was growing
and to arrange for shipping. One branch of the court's rationale was based on the fact
that the buyer retained control over the crops - the so-called "joint venture" theory.
See text accompanying notes 123-31 infra. However, the court also stated:
Plaintiffs did not buy property synthetically divided into small units in order
to mask intangible interests in the total business enterprise.... Plaintiff's
profit, if any, would be determined by the difference between cost and selling
price of this particular 80 acres of grapes, not by fractional participation in
the profits or losses of the seller's business operations. Id. at 425, 41 Cal.
Rptr. at 871. (Emphasis added.)
100 United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 999
(1966) (quantity of goods for resale not so small that they could not be sold by pur-
chaser); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), Petition for cert. dis-
missed per curiam, 347 U.S. 925 (1954) (twenty acres); SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647(S.D. Fla. 1941) (twenty acres). Sarmento v. Arbax Packing Co., supra note 99, gives
a rendering of Howey which is curious in more than one respect. The California court
seems to indicate that the buyers in Howey received "fractional interests in the total
business enterprise" so as to have a "fractional participation in the profits or losses of
the (management enterprise's] business operations." Id. at 871, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
The buyers in Howey would certainly have been astounded if they had been told that
their plots of land were subject to internal operating losses of the management corpora-
tion, and the seller would have been equally surprised to discover that the buyers had a
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property is recommitted to the enterprise, the same risks ensue no
matter what the property's size. 1'
right to share in the operating profits of the management corporation or a right to
share in the proceeds of liquidation. In committing their property to the control of
the management corporation, the buyers did not acquire an enterprise interest similar
to that of the corporation's stockholders; the buyers did not agree that their land would
bear a share of the internal operating losses shown on the income statement of the
management enterprise.
A separate problem is the manner in which a number of buyers are to share in the
proceeds derived from the several separately owned pieces of property under the super-
vision of the management enterprise. This matter will be treated later, but at this point
it would be well to point out that a careful reading of the lower court Howey opinions
indicates that, although the management enterprise pooled the fruit from all plots for
purposes of marketing, each owner received net proceeds based on the amount of fruit
harvested from his land, not a proportionate share of the proceeds based on the ratio
which the quantity of his land bore to the total quantity of land under the control of
the management enterprise. Each purchaser "looked to the fruitage of his own grove
and not to the fruitage of the groves as a whole." SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d
714, 717 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
Thus, the future profits of each purchaser's land were not diminished pro rata by
the lack of profits on other land. This was dear in Blackwell v. Bentsen, supra, and
appears to have been the case in SEC v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81 (D.
Mass. 1962) and SEC v. Bailey, supra.
In any event, the method of distributing proceeds from managed property relates
to future profit experience and not to risk to the buyer's original value. Even if each
landowner takes a share of overall proceeds based on the size of his land, so that some
owners' profits are reduced by inferior production on other land, no owner's land itself
(representing his initial investment) would be subject to losses resulting from lack
of production from another's property.
101 A somewhat more difficult problem is presented by the following set of facts.
B purchases property from S. At the time of purchase, it is virtually certain that B will
be forced to relinquish the property to the supervision (and the attendant risks) of a
management enterprise, not just to generate income, but to preserve the value of the
property at the level of his initial investment. At the time the transaction is attacked
as a "security," neither B nor other buyers have recommitted their property to a man-
agement enterprise.
In such a case, since B does not concurrently recommit his property for use or em-
ployment by an enterprise, it is difficult to say that B's original value was subjected
to the risks of an enterprise as part of a transaction connected with S. If it were dear
that the market value of the property could not be preserved without its being relin-
quished to supervisory control, perhaps it could be said that part of the original value
was paid in recognition of the future success of the management enterprise to which
B would ultimately have to recommit his property. This would place the result on a
rationale applicable to the fact pattern discussed under the next heading, in which the
buyer furnishes his initial value in recognition of the yet unrealized success of an enter-
prise with which the buyer may have no legal relationship. In such a case, part of the
present value of the property purchased is dearly attributable to the anticipated but
unaccomplished success of an enterprise.
It might also be reasoned that, since S could have reasonably foreseen that B would
be forced to recommit the property to the risks of an enterprise, the sale by S and any
subsequent management arrangement entered into by B should be integrated into one
transaction.
The size of the property would be relevant to the element of risk to initial value
if it tended to prove the virtual certainty that the property received by the buyer would
have to be recommitted to a management enterprise to maintain its fair market value at
the level of initial investment. Small size would not be relevant to the issue of risk if it
proved only that the property would have to be recommitted to generate income.
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(iv) Tangible or Intangible Property: Original Value Paid
in Recognition of the Yet-Unrealized Success of an Enterprise; No
Legal Relationship With Enterprise Necessary.-Sometimes the
buyer receives property other than that described in the preceding
three subsections."0 2 The amount of initial value which the buyer
pays for the property is arrived at by taking into account the yet-
unrealized success of an enterprise. If the expected success of the
enterprise is not forthcoming, the value of the property purchased is
deflated pro tanto to a level below the initial investment. The en-
terprise may03 or may not'0" be that of the seller of the property.
It is not necessary that the buyer have any continuing legal relation-
ship with the enterprise.'
Unlike the situations already canvassed, the buyer does not re-
ceive a proprietary interest or a creditor's claim for repayment; nor
does he receive property that is recommitted for use by an enterprise.
Instead, the transaction is such that some portion of the present
value of the property received by the buyer can only be explained in
terms of the future successful operations of an enterprise. Of course,
the foregoing characterization may apply to the percentage-share,
debt, and 'recommitted property" transactions already examined, but
such arrangements involve other more discernible risks which ema-
nate from the very nature of the legal relationships created between
the buyer and the risk enterprise.' A subsisting legal relationship
102 This assumption is made only for the purposes of analysis. Note, however, that
transactions often possess more than one of the types of risk discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 83-101 supra and 103-18 infra.
103SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); United States v.
Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962); Nicewarner v.
Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965); SEC v. Latta, 250 F. Supp. 170 (N.D.
Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 356 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 940
(1966); Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1961); People v. Woolson, 181 Cal. App. 2d 657, 5 Cal. Rptr. 766 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1960) (a melange of ill-drawn agreements involved in a bizarre scheme to
sell gold to the Mexican government).
104 Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824
(1961).
10 5 SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); Roe v. United States,
287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961).
106In Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1961), the buyer received, in consideration of his initial value, a "member-
ship" in a country dub that was not yet completed. The "membership" gave him the
right to use all dub facilities. However, he did not receive any interest in the country
dub enterprise or its future profits, and he was required to pay monthly dues if and when
the club was completed. Thus, it cannot be said that the risk to the buyer's original value
arose by virtue of his having a percentage-share interest or a creditor's claim. The risk
stemmed from the fact that his initial value was paid in recognition of the future com-
pletion and operation of the club by the seller's enterprise; that is, part, if not all, of
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need not be the basis of risk, however. The failure of an enterprise
may, by force of circumstances, 10 7 depress the value of property re-
ceived by the buyer. If part of the present value of such property
is attributable to the anticipated accomplishments of an enterprise, a
portion of the buyer's initial investment may vanish if success is not
achieved.
This type of risk is frequently manifested in situations where the
buyer purchases property for capital appreciation on the strength of
representations that gains will be forthcoming upon successful com-
pletion of various developmental projects.' The purchase price
has two components: the inherent value of the property, aside from
the expected effect of the developmental enterprise, plus an incre-
ment which represents the discounted value of ultimate enterprise
success. Thus, if the developmental enterprise fails, the buyer not
only misses his capital gains but also suffers a loss of his initial in-
vestment.
The same type of risk to initial value may attend the purchase of
an intangible right to future payments, e.g., a percentage interest in
royalties0 9 or a share in the future distribution of an estate which is
presently in litigation."0
(v) Property With Fair Market Value Less Than Initial
Value: Conditional Right To Receive Payments.-The hybrid trans-
actions to be discussed under this heading have caused a great deal
of consternation in the courts, and understandably so. The basic
factual pattern underlying the problem can be stated quite simply.
B purchases property (hereafter referred to as the "purchased prop-
erty") from S at more than its current fair market value. For pur-
the value of the membership was attributable to the successful materialization of dub
benefits.
1 07 In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) and Roe v. United
States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961), this force of dr-
cumstances lay in the fact that the oil content of the buyer's property would be taken
to be more or less similar to that of nearby property on which drilling tests were being
conducted. In Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, supra note 106, the membership
would not have been worth very much without the accompanying golf course, bar, and
swimming pool.
108 Some of this type of risk seems to have been present in several of the productive
crop land cases already analyzed. See, e.g., SEC v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp.
81 (D. Mass. 1962), in which part of the initial value seems to have been paid in
recognition of the future success of cultivation operations being conducted on surround-
ing land.
109United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917
(1962); Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965).
110 SEC v. Latta, 250 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 356 F.2d 103 (9th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 940 (1966).
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poses of focusing on the issues, it will be assumed that the purchased
property is not a proprietary interest or debt-holder's claim; that it
is not recommitted to use by an enterprise;... and that no part of its
present fair market value is attributable to the anticipated but un-
realized success of an enterprise." 2  S promises to pay B a certain
amount upon the occurrence of a specified event, e.g., S's making
sales to persons whose names were furnished by B (customarily
called "referral sales")."'
The confusion probably springs from two seemingly applicable
propositions which tend to militate against holding that such a trans-
action is a security. First, since the buyer receives the purchased
111 We have already dealt with the situation in which as part of the transaction,
the property received is recommitted to employment by an enterprise. See text ac-
companying notes 87-101 supra.
112 Sometimes the initial value furnished by the buyer is paid in recognition of the
future success of an enterprise (particularly a developmental enterprise) with which
the buyer may have no legal relationship. This problem was dealt with in text ac-
companying notes 102-10 supra.
113 Pennsylvania Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 3 BLUE
SKY L. REP. 5 70631 (Pa. C.P. 1963), affd, 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964)
(vacuum cleaners); Fidelity Credit Co. v. Bradford, 177 So. 2d 635 (La. Ct. App.),
appeal denied, 248 La. 430, 179 So. 2d 273 (1965) (vacuum cleaners; overcharge not
dear); Emery v. So-Soft, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964) (water softener);
Yoder v. So-Soft, Inc., 202 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio C.P. 1963) (water softener).
In Pennsylvania Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., supra, the
court held that no security was involved because the buyer was to secure the additional
payments through "his own efforts." Thus, the decision rested partially on the "joint
venture" theory, which will be considered later. See text accompanying notes 123-31
infra. The second leg of the opinion was based upon the court's interpretation of the
word "profits" in the Howey formula. The court arrived at the highly questionable
conclusion that the "profits" which the buyer is led to expect must be payable only if
the risk enterprise makes a profit. Thus, the court impliedly excluded from security
classification a transaction wherein the buyer furnishes initial value in consideration
for a right to receive a sum certain, contingent upon the happening of a specific event,
but unrelated to the operating profits of the enterprise. See text accompanying notes
146-59 infra.
Emery v. So-Soft, Inc., supra, was decided on the same two grounds announced in
Pennsylvania Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., supra. In both
cases the courts intimated that the payments for referral sales were simply compensation
to the buyers for furnishing sales leads and introducing the seller's product to their
friends. If it be assumed that the buyers were receiving no more than fair market value
for their so-called services, then the overcharge remains unexplained. Certainly the
buyers did not pay the overcharge for the right to receive the fair market value of
their services.
Yoder v. So-Soft, Inc., supra, involved facts very similar to those in Emery v. So-
Soft, Inc., supra, but the court seemed to have a better insight into the financial reali-
ties. In holding that the transaction constituted a security, the court noted that "the
sale of the [water] softener was nothing more than a 'gimmick' used by the defendant
to make the sale of a money making scheme to gullible purchasers." Yoder v. So-Soft,
Inc., supra at 330. This is in contrast to Fidelity Credit Co. v. Bradford, 177 So. 2d
635, 640 (L.a. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 248 La. 430, 179 So. 2d 273 (1965), wherein
the court, without any analysis, concluded that the payments promised to the buyer
were "advertising gimmicks" used to sell vacuum cleaners.
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property, one is tempted to say that the buyer has completed a simple
purchase, has gone his way with property in hand, and should not be
heard to say that his initial value has been subjected to the risks of
an enterprise. This approach overlooks the spread between the
original value furnished and the current fair market value of the
purchased property. Second, a problem is raised by the general
principle that a "bad bargain" is of no concern to the law. This
principle does not seem applicable to the situation in which the
buyer receives a conditional right to future payments and where he
has reason to believe not only that the value differential will be
recouped but also that he may receive benefits over and above the
amount of the overcharge.
It is submitted that the court, in Yoder v. So-Soft, Inc.,"4 cor-
rectly characterized the overcharge-sale-conditional-payment transac-
tion as a novel method of financing, whereby the overcharge spread
is subjected to the risks of an enterprise in the manner described
under the previous subheading. For his overcharge, the buyer has
received an intangible right to receive payments upon the happening
of a certain event. This right to future payments has no present
value except in terms of the future success of the enterprise. It
seems that Pennsylvania Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Con-
sultants, Inc."' and Emery v. So-Soft, Inc."' might have been de-
cided differently if the specified amounts had been payable only out
of profits made by the seller on each referral sale or out of the
overall operating profits of the seller's enterprise."' The benefits
expected by the buyer might then have been more speculative, but
the fact that the buyer was entitled to a guaranteed amount on each
referral sale, whether or not the risk enterprise had profits,"' should
not be controlling.
It seems safe to say that any improper analysis in the foregoing
cases resulted from a failure to recognize the rather disguised form of
risk to initial investment and from a narrow interpretation of the
114 202 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio C.P. 1963).
115 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 9 70631 (Pa. C.P. 1963), aff'd, 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d
428 (1964).
116 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964).
117 The attitude of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Consumers Research
case can be gleaned from the following statement: "[IThe [buyer] ... is not promised
a share in the profits, but is given a specific fee, regardless of profits . . . " Common-
wealth ex rel. Pa. Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253,
256, 199 A.2d 428, 429 (1964). The court should have considered what would have
happened if the enterprise had become insolvent.
118 See text accompanying notes 146-59 infra.
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word "profits" (in the Howey formula) to mean only payments
made out of profits earned by the risk enterprise.
(b) Summary.-The foregoing exegesis of risk was meant
to convey some notion of the multifarious character of risk to initial
investment. It has been noted that the element of risk may be dis-
guised so as to escape notice,"' especially if the focal point of analy-
sis is the expectation of profits. Moreover, if the term "profits" is
construed narrowly and the risk factor is not properly identified, it
is possible that certain transactions involving genuine risk to the
buyer's initial value might escape security classification. 2 '
Since there are a number of diverse forms of risk to initial in-
vestment, it would be very difficult to ascribe any definite meaning
to the words "common enterprise" in the Howey formula. On
balance, this phrase seems to be of little aid in the process of identi-
fying a security.
Attention has also been called to a circumstance which tends to
negate the existence of risk, viz., the buyer's receipt of property,
other than a proprietary interest in, or debt-holder's claim against,
the seller's enterprise. The discussion so far has focused on situa-
tions in which there is risk to initial value despite the receipt of
property.' Later, cases will be examined in which the receipt of
property or services should be taken to exclude the presence of
risk.' 2
2
By training the spotlight on risk to initial investment, it is not
suggested that the other elements of the traditional Howey formula
- lack of control over the enterprise and the expectation of profits
- are not essential qualities of a "security." Recall that the basic
objective of this inquiry is to isolate the characteristics of a trans-
action which create a need for the special fraud protection of the
securities laws. It is clear that Congress and the state legislatures
did not intend the securities laws to provide relief against fraud in
all transactions. However, the special anti-fraud procedures, pro-
119 Cf. Sarmento v. Arbax Packing Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 421, 41 Cal. Rptr. 869
(Dist Cc. App. 1964); Fidelity Credit Co. v. Bradford, 177 So. 2 d 635 (La. Ct. App.),
appeal denied, 248 La. 430, 179 So. 2d 273 (1965); Emery v. So-Soft, Inc., 199
N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Cr. App. 1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Pa. Sec. Comm'n v. Con-
sumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964), affirming 3
BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70631 (Pa. C.P. 1963).
120 Emery v. So-Soft, Inc., supra note 119; Commonwealth ex rel. Pa. Sec. Comm'n
v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., supra note 119.
12 1 See text accompanying notes 87-118 supra.
i12 See text accompanying notes 138-44 infra. See also text accompanying notes
92-95 smupra
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tections, and remedies do seem pre-eminently appropriate where a
buyer puts up initial value that will be subject to the perils of enter-
prise failure even when there is no fraud.
(4) Lack of Buyer's Familiarity With, or Control Over, the
Enterprise.-The last statement is subject to one important qualifi-
cation. The danger of fraud being practiced upon the buyer is con-
siderably reduced when his initial investment is subjected to the
risks of an enterprise with which he is familiar at the time of the
transaction and over which he exercises management control. Un-
der such circumstances, the buyer is hardly in a position to claim
that he was induced to furnish value by means of misstatements or
half-truths about the character of the venture. Moreover, if the
buyer exercises his control prerogatives, he is in a better position to
protect his original value from the hazards of enterprise operation.
Thus, the so-called "joint venture" theory has been developed. Its
effect is to exclude from the "security" category those transactions
involving the subjection of the buyer's initial investment to the risks
of an enterprise with which he is familiar and in which he plays an
active management role.l"
The use of the phrase "joint venture" to describe this judicial
doctrine is rather anomalous. The principle should apply only
when the buyer is intimately familiar with the enterprise and ac-
tively participates in its affairs. These are the special factors which
protect the buyer against the dangers of fraud and risk.'24 How-
ever, it is perfectly possible to have a "joint venture" (in a more
123 Drug Management, Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 91293
(D.D.C. 1963) (buyer purchased drugstore franchise); Weinstock v. L. A. Carpet, Inc.,
234 Cal. App. 2d 809, 44 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Sarmento v. Arbax
Packing Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 421, 41 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (one branch
of opinion); Hargiss v. Royal Air Properties, Inc., 206 Cal. App. 2d 406, 23 Cal. Rptr.
678 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Polikoff v. Levy, 55 IIl. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807,
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903 (1965); Emery v. So-Soft, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Cc.
App. 1964) (one branch of opinion); Commonwealth ex rel. Pa. Sec. Comm'n v. Con-
sumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964), affirming 3
BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70631 (Pa. C.P. 1963) (one branch of opinion). Contra, Jack-
son v. Robertson, 90 Ariz. 405, 368 P.2d 645 (1962).
Under California law there is a specific exemption for "any bona fide joint venture
interest, except such interests when offered to the public." CAL. CORP. CODE §
25100 (m). Nonetheless, the cases applying the statute involve most of the same issues
pertinent to the judicial doctrine. Note, however, that a side effect of including the
"joint venture" theory in the statutory exemptive structure is to make a joint venture
interest prima facie a security.
124 Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807 (1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 903 (1965): The buyer "has an equal right of control . . . and [the) ...
right to know what is going on." Id. at 234, 204 N.E.2d at 809.
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traditional sense) with passive members.'25 Presumably, such joint-
venture interests would constitute securities.'26 It seems that "joint
control" is the critical element; the buyer must play "no mere pas-
sive role.""'2 It is therefore suggested that this doctrine be referred
to as the "joint control" exception.
Some courts have liberally applied the theory to certain factual
patterns. In one case, the court based its decision on the buyer's
"equal right of control" and his "equal right to know what [was] ...
going on."'28  In another case, the court found that the buyer was
taking part in a sales enterprise when his only chore was to write
letters to his friends introducing the enterprise's product.2 9
Although the joint control concept has been rejected in some
quarters, 3 ' it seems sound in principle and has been included as a
component of the author's proposed formula for identifying a se-
1 It seems that the essentials of a joint venture are simply "a community of in-
terest... [and] an expectation of profit." Id. at 235, 204 N.E.2d at 810.
226 SEC Rule 3a11-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (Supp. 1966) defines "equity se-
curity" to include an "interest in a joint venture."
-7 Weinstock v. L A. Carpet, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 2d 809, 44 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1965). "The parties are equal owners and stand on equal footing as entre-
preneurs." Id. at 813, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
128 Polikoff v. Levy, 55 IMI. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807, cert. denied, 382
U.S. 903 (1965). (Emphasis added.) The defendant wrote letters to a number
of friends and relatives, offering investment units in a motel enterprise. It was any-
thing but clear that the buyers actually knew "what was going on" at the time of pur-
chase or that they would thereafter take an active part in management. It may be that
the decision was influenced more by the private and isolated nature of the transaction
than by the element of "joint controL"
129 The prosecution failed to introduce evidence that the buyer had been told that
he would "not be permitted to try his hand or abilities as a salesman." Pennsylvania
Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70631
(Pa. C.P. 1963), aff'd, 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964). The buyer was to receive
certain payments if the seller's enterprise were successful in selling goods to the buyer's
friends. The buyer wrote letters to his friends, telling them about the product and
giving them advance notice that the seller would be in touch with them.
This "studied attempt to fleece purchasers of a 'Built-In-Vacuum System' by secur-
ing an unconscionable overcharge" also had its chain letter aspects. Commonwealth
ex rel. Pa. Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 254, 199
A.2d 428 (1964). The buyer was to receive payments if the seller completed sales
with persons whose names were furnished by the buyer's friends. The court seemed to
overlook the fact that the buyer had no control whatever over the latter sales.
The Consumers Research rationale was adopted in another case in which the buyer
did not even write to his friends, Emery v. So-Soft, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1964).
1sO E.g., Jackson v. Robertson, 90 Ariz. 405, 368 P.2d 645 (1962). "[IThe Se-
curities Act was not enacted to protect any of the parties to this law suit. Nevertheless,
the contract herein called for issuance of corporate securities which might very well
have been foisted upon the investing public by any of the five men involved." Id. at
409, 368 P.2d at 648. The reasoning is specious, for the application of the joint control
rule among active managers does not prevent a court from finding that a later transaction
with outsiders constitutes a security.
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curity. However, the exception should be applied only when the
buyer's position truly reduces the possibility of fraud and gives him
the power to affect the risk to his initial investment. At the time
of the transaction, the buyer should possess both knowledge of the
risk enterprise and the power to influence the course of its future
operations. It seems highly questionable whether the joint-control
theory should govern where the buyer assumes a management role
after the purported security transaction but has had no knowledge
of the risk enterprise prior thereto.'
(5) Reasonable Expectation of Benefits in Excess of Initial
Value.--Thus far, two major characteristics of a security transaction
have been examined: (1) risk to the buyer's initial value, and (2)
the buyer's lack of familiarity with, or control over, the risk enter-
prise. At this juncture, it may well be asked whether these qualities
alone are sufficient to distinguish a security from the universe of
transactions.
(a) In General.-The question actually becomes: should
the special fraud protection of the securities laws be applied to all
transactions in which the buyer's initial value is subjected to the
risks of an enterprise with which he is not familiar and over which
he has no control? Howey'32 has answered this question in the
negative. The seller must have induced the buyer to furnish initial
value by means of promises or representations which give rise to
a reasonable expectation of "profits." Thus, even though risk to
initial investment may be the most economically troublesome quality
of a security transaction (as has been earnestly contended), the Su-
1 31 In Drug Management, Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91293
(D.D.C. 1963), the buyer purchased a franchise for the operation of a specially
constructed drugstore. The buyer was to operate the drugstore and thus would
control the exploitation of the franchise after the alleged "security" transaction. There
were no facts to indicate that the buyer had any knowledge of other enterprises in which
such franchises had been employed. Held, no security. The franchising business seems
to be booming from coast to coast. See The Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1966, p. 1,
col. 6.
The buyer is in control of his business after he pays for his franchise (which is
often tied to some kind of gadget or other tangible property). To some extent, there-
fore, he can directly defend his investment against operational risks. However, since
the buyer is generally ill-informed about the mechanics of the franchised business, he is
as susceptible as anyone to fraud in the franchising transaction. These considerations
seem to have been at work in Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965), where
the buyer was to be one of three stockholders of a corporation franchised for the opera-
tion of automatic archery lanes. The court did not apply the joint control theory, even
though it appears that the buyer might well have exercised management control over
the enterprise thereafter.
182 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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preme Court seems to require some additional element to establish
seller responsibility for the transaction.
The requirement seems sound; securities regulation does not
appear to be necessarily appropriate for all types of transactions in
which the buyer's initial value is subjected to the risks of an enter-
prise. For example, the SEC has indicated that it would not ordi-
narily consider the term "security" to embrace trading stamps, street-
car tokens, meal tickets, Christmas gift certificates, box tops, or
theater tickets.' Technically speaking, the initial value furnished
by the buyer of such items is subjected to the risks of the seller's
enterprise in much the same way as that of a creditor.' It is diffi-
cult to find any expectation of "profit" in these situations," 5 and per-
haps this is why, under the teaching of Howey, they should not be
classified as securities. Unfortunately, the analysis cannot be so sim-
plistic. The SEC has indicated a willingness to take a second look at
these transactions if they are "used as a method of corporate financ-
ing.""' The reason for closer scrutiny would seem to be the in-
creased degree of risk, since the expectation of "profits" would still
be missing. This raises the question of whether a sufficiently high
degree of risk will call the securities laws into operation, even in
the absence of a reasonable expectation of profits.137
The same issue arises in the context of the so-called cooperative
apartment arrangements, some of which have been excluded from
the "security" category because of the lack of "profit" motive. 8'
However, one may also ask whether there is any manifestation of
risk to the buyer's initial investment. The buyer in these transac-
tions often receives full rental value (usually a lease) in return for
his initial investment.3" If he occupies the leasehold, it cannot be
133 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3890, 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 1041 (Jan. 25,
1958).
134 See discussion of the creditor's risk at text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
135 These devices have been described as "media created primarily for exchange."
See Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension
and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 795, 809 nA5 (1964).
186 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3890, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 1041 (Jan.
25, 1958).
137 Extreme risk seems to be the only reasonable basis for the holding in Strauss v.
State, 147 8.E.2d 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (money orders).
138 These transactions typically involve the buyer's transfer of property or a large
initial sum of money to a corporation in exchange for a long-term lease of an apartment
and stock in the corporation. At first blush, it certainly appears that the buyer assumes
the same risks to his initial investment as any other percentage-share purchaser. See
text accompanying notes 83-84 supra. But "no profit or income is generally antici-
pated." Op. Ariz. Att'y Gen., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 9 70554 (Aug. 11, 1961).
139 "The substance of the purchase of such a share would amount to... securing
a place to live .... - Ibid.
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said that property received has been recommitted to use by an en-
terprise in the Howey sense.' It could be argued, with consider-
able force, that part of the initial value furnished for the apartment
was paid in recognition of the future success of the apartment com-
plex, i.e., the fair market value of the apartment was probably ascer-
tained by taking into account the anticipated but unrealized success
of the apartment enterprise as a whole. Thus, the buyer's initial
value would be subject to the risks of an enterprise in the sense of
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.4' On the other hand, the apart-
ment dwellers often exercise control in the affairs of the apartment
complex, so that the joint control exception might apply. 4' In sum,
it seems impossible to say unequivocally that the ground for exclud-
ing these arrangements from security classification is the lack of an
expectation of "profits"; the crucial consideration may be the ab-
sence of risk.'43
Thus, while it appears rather certain that the expectation of
"profits" will not cause a transaction to be a security where the
buyer has not furnished initial value which is in some way subjected
to the risks of an enterprise, 44 it is difficult to say with certainty
that a transaction involving a high degree of risk to initial invest-
ment, but lacking the expectation of profits, will not be called a
security. 14
5
140 See text accompanying notes 87-101 supra for a discussion of transactions in
which the buyer receives property (other than a creditor's claim or a proprietary in-
terest) which has a fair market value equal to initial value but which is immediately
recommitted to use by an enterprise.
141 320 U.S. 344 (1943). See text accompanying notes 102-10 supra.
342Willmont v. Tellone, 137 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). "The pur-
pose of the corporation was to be purely incidental to the actual lease of the co-opera-
tive apartment-in other words, a vehicle by which control could be exercised." Id. at
612.
143 The California blue sky administrator has indicated that a cooperative apart-
ment would be considered a security if the apartment complex were still in the develop-
mental stages. On the reasoning of Silver Hills, part of the buyer's original value
would then clearly be paid in recognition of the yet unrealized success of the entire
complex. See Sobieski, Securities Regulation in California: Recent Developments, 11
U.C.LA.L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1963). However, as we shall see, the Silver Hills fact pattern
contains an element of expected profits, and so the analysis of that case does little to
answer the question of whether risk to initial value, without reasonable expectation of
profit, will support a security finding.
144 This would be the situation in which the buyer receives property which is not
a proprietary interest or a creditor's claim, which is not recommitted for use by an en-
terprise, and which has a present fair market value (no part of which is determined by
taking into account the anticipated but unaccomplished success of an enterprise) equal
to the buyer's original investment.
145 But see Note, 14 HAsTINGS L.J. 181 (1962): "[Historically the courts have
firmly recognized that the investor must put up money or its equivalent for a share or
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Nevertheless, two generalities may safely be stated about the re-
lationship between risk to initial value and reasonable expectation
of "profit": First, both factors are necessary in most security transac-
tions. Second, as the degree of risk to initial value increases, the
need for a well-defined "profit" motive lessens; i.e., the elements of
risk to initial value and reasonable expectation of profits are on a
sliding scale of inverse proportionality. The preceding statements
underscore the need for an accurate analysis of the various types of
"profit."
(b) Species of 'Profits.'--Properly considered, "profits"
refer to payments or distributions which may be either fixed 4 ' or
variable and either conditioned upon 48 or unrelated to4. the
stake in an enterprise or venture with the expectation of profit before his interest can be
classified as a security." Ibid. (Footnotes omitted.)
148Farrell v. United States, 321 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
992 (1964); United States v. Attaway, 211 F. Supp. 682, (W.D. La. 1962); SEC v.
Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961) (fixed and variable); Donovan v.
Dixon, 261 Minn. 455, 113 N.W.2d 432 (1962); State v. Davis, 131 N.W.2d 730
(N.D. 1964); Yoder v. So-Soft, Inc., 202 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio C.P. 1963).
147Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Schaefer,
299 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962) (limited to ten times
original investment); SEC v. Latta, 250 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per curam,
356 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 940 (1966); Nicewarner v.
Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965); Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp.
59 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Bellerue v. Business Files Institute, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 488, 393
P.2d 401, 39 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964); Smith v. Sherman, 206 Cal. App. 2d 93, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 487 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Rivlin v. Levine, 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr.
587 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); People v. Woolson, 181 Cal. App. 2d 657, 5 Cal. Rptr.
766 (Dist Ct. App. 1960); People v. Smith, 180 Cal. App. 2d 420, 4 Cal. Rptr. 282
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
Where property has been recommitted to an enterprise for management, there are
several ways in which profits can be determined. For example, where the property
being managed is productive, three possible situations may occur. First, the produce
of each owner's property may be sold and the net profits accounted for separately.
Second, the produce from all properties managed may be pooled for selling, with the
net profits being divided in proportion to the produce derived from each owner's
property. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1964); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203
F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 925 (1954). The schemes for divi-
sion of profits are not dear in some cases. See SEC v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F.
Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1962); SECv. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1941). Third,
the produce may be pooled for selling and the net profits divided in proportion to the
quantity or value of each owner's property. Op. Fla. Att'y Gen. 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
5 70653 (Dec. 14, 1964).
Where the managing enterprise has the power to sell the recommitted property,
such property may be pooled for sale and the proceeds divided according to the ratio
that the quantity of each owner's property bears to the total quantity of all propery
sold. See SEC v. Great W. Land & Dev., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. g 91537 (D.
Ariz. 1965) (Transfer Binder 1964-1966), rev'd on other grounds and remanded,
355 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1966); SEC v. Comstock Coin Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
9 91414 (D. Nev. 1964) (Transfer Binder 1964-1966); SEC v. Willoughy Coin
Exch., CCH Fnn. SEC. L REP. 9 91355 (S.D. Cal. 1964). On the other hand, each
buyer's property may be sold and the proceeds accounted for separately. United States
v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 999 (1966).
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profits shown on the income statement of the risk enterprise. The
reference point of profitability is the buyer. The important consid-
eration here is whether the buyer has been led reasonably to expect
some benefit over and above his initial investment, whether or not
the inurement is conditioned upon the overall internal profitability
of the risk enterprise. " '
Must the benefit which the buyer is led to expect be in the na-
ture of realized income? SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.151 and
Roe v. United States52 tell us that it is sufficient if the buyer is led
reasonably to believe that property which he receives will appreciate
in value over and above his initial investment.'53 Silver Hills Coun-
try Club v. Sobieski54 presents a somewhat more complicated prob-
lem. The buyer, in consideration of his initial value, received a
membership in a then-unfinished country club, but he received no
interest in the assets or profits of the dub. It has been said that
the "profit" which the buyer was led to expect was the future use
of valuable club facilities.'55 On the facts of the case, this theory
will not stand up, for the buyer was required to pay continuing
monthly dues for the use of club facilities. It seems more accurate
to say that the buyer purchased an intangible piece of property in
the nature of an entrance privilege. The price paid for the entrance
privilege was probably less than it would have been had the club
148 See authorities, except United States v. Schaefer, cited in the first paragraph of
note 147 supra. See also Donovan v. Dixon, 261 Minn. 455, 113 N.W.2d 432 (1962).
149 See authorities, except Donovan v. Dixon supra note 148, cited note 146 supra
and in the second and third paragraphs of note 147 supra. See also United States v.
Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962); Yoder v. So-
Soft, Inc., 202 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio C.P. 1963).
150 The following consideration would seem to be irrelevant: "There is no refer-
ence to profits in the Advertising Commission Agreement. The Commission is
payable... whether or not the company makes a profit on any particular sale or for
any period of time." Pennsylvania Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants,
Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70631, at 66352 (Pa. C.P. 1963), aff'd, 414 Pa. 253, 199
A.2d 428 (1964). Unfortunately, the Howey formula did not specify to whose
profits it referred. Upon close analysis, it appears clear that the court was not referring
to the internal operating profits of the management enterprise to which the buyer's
property had been recommitted.
151320 U.S. 344 (1943).
152287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961).
153 "A reasonably prudent-imprudent, prospective purchaser was certainly end-
fled to infer that the promised bonanza would come to him without any expenditure
on his part." ld. at 438, n.4.
154 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
155 "The purchaser, by buying a promotional membership, was risking his capital
in the expectation that the potential benefits of a country ciub membership would
materialize." Note, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 156, 158 (1962).
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been completed. Thus, the buyer had reason to believe that his en-
trance privilege would appreciate in value.
The question remains, however, whether the buyer's expectation
of valuable non-pecuniary benefits will fulfill the requirement for
profit inducement. In a proper case, it seems that the Silver Hills
rationale would be appropriate. " '
And so it appears that the restrictive readings of the word
"profits" in the Howey formula are unjustified. " ' It is sufficient if
the seller is responsible for leading the buyer to believe that some
valuable benefit, over and above his initial investment, will accrue
as a result of the operations of an enterprise.
(c) The "Speculation" Red Herring.-Before leaving this
analysis of the essential characteristics of a security, it is well to note
that "speculation" is not such a characteristic."' Risk to initial
value is a prerequisite, but the degree of risk need not be so high as
to make the investment "speculative."' 9
E. The Desirability of a Pervasive Definition
As already noted, the definition sections of the federal and
many state securities statutes contain a list of rather specific devices
and arrangements,' plus a group of general classifications which
have no readily identifiable content.' 6 ' In cases where the form
of the alleged security transaction does not come within the literal
coverage of the specific definitional categories, the courts and agen-
cies, in the process of applying the general statutory language, have
been forced to evolve statements of the essential characteristics of a
1506 For example, an enterprise, still in the initial promotional stages, sells coupons
entitling the buyers to goods or services having a fair market value greater than the
initial value furnished.
157 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc.,
3 BLuiE SKY L REP. 5 70631 (Pa. C.P. 1963), afd, 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428
(1964); Emery v. So-Soft, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964).
158 "We reject the suggestion... that... [a security] is necessarily missing where
the enterprise is not speculative ...." SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301
(1946). Similarly, "the term 'speculation' does not signal automatic subjection to
corporate securities regulation." Sarmento v. Arbax Packing Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d
421, 424, 41 Cal. Rptr. 869, 871 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
159 Thus, the following statement appears to be somewhat misleading: "The im-
portant facts here are the speculative nature of the interest sold and its size." Nice-
warner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Colo. 1965).
100 E.g., "any note, stock ... bond ... evidence of indebtedness." Securities Act
§ 2(1), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964).
101 E.g., "certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement
... transferable share, investment contract ... or, in general, any interest or instru-
ment commonly known as a security." Ibid.
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security."' However, even though the tests for identifying a se-
curity have been developed in the context of the general definitional
classifications, there is no reason why such tests should not per-
vade the entire section. If the security formula and its underlying
analysis 63 accurately describe the essential economic factors which
create a need for the fundamental fraud protections of the securities
laws, then presumably they should be controlling even where the
form of the transaction comes within the literal coverage of the defi-
nition section. This approach has been suggested by the courts'"
and urged by the commentators. "5
The precise issue here is whether, in the absence of one or more
of the essential economic characteristics of a security, a transaction
should nonetheless be classified as a security simply because it fits
into one of the readily identifiable pigeonholes of the definition
statute.'66 It has already been noted that some adjudicators are wont
to exclude transactions from the literal coverage of the definition
provisions where the buyer exercises some management control over
the risk enterprise'67 and where the elements of risk to initial value
162 E.g., SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); Polikoff v.
Levy, 55 Il. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 809, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903 (1965).
163 See text accompanying notes 47-159 supra.
164 Recall the general mandate of Howey that "form [is] . . . disregarded for sub-
stance and emphasis [is] ... placed upon economic reality." 328 U.S. at 298. See
Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186
(1961), wherein the following rule of interpretation was announced: "[The trans-
action] ... qualifies... [as a security] within the literal language of the [statute] ....
The crucial question nevertheless remains whether the sale of such a membership comes
within the regulatory purpose of the... Securities Act." Id. at 814, 361 P.2d at 908,
13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
In People v. Davenport, 13 Cal. 2d 681, 91 P.2d 892 (1939), the court stated:
[W]ords . . . may be given a contracted meaning dependent upon the con-
nection in which they are employed, and considering the general purpose or
scheme entertained by the legislature . . . and the rule that words will not
be given their literal meaning when to do so would evidently carry the opera-
tion of the enactment far beyond the legislative intent... [make it] clear that
the legislature intended by use of the words ... in [the definition section]
... such as 'note' and 'evidence of indebtedness,' that each such expression
should possess the same general characteristics as the word 'security'.... Id.
at 685-86, 91 P.2d at 895.
165 "This doctrine of 'substance-over-form' . . . should be, and apparently is avail-
able for purposes of definitional exclusion as well as inclusion." Pasquesi, The Ex-
panding "Securities" Concept, 49 ILL. B.J. 728, 732 (1961).
16 6 The question of whether certain transactions ought to be excluded from the
coverage of the securities laws even though all the essential economic characteristics
of a security are present will be discussed in text accompanying notes 184-204 infra.
167 See authorities cited note 123 supra. Hargiss v. Royal Air Properties, Inc.,
206 Cal. App. 2d 406, 23 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (involving both stock
and notes).
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or reasonable expectation of profits are lacking.' However, in
some cases, where the transactions at issue possessed all the charac-
teristics of a security and could have been classified as securities on
the basis of an "economic realities" analysis, the courts have evinced
a tendency to reach cursory results based simply on literal cover-
age.'69 There are at least two spurious considerations which have
led some courts to forego full analysis of transactions which appear
to be securities in form.
(1) "Handy Latin Aphorisms": The Ejusdem Generis Ca-
rousel.-The misty maxims of statutory construction are often dou-
ble-edged swords. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,7 ° the
form of the transaction at bar did not come within one of the spe-
cific categories of the definition statute. The defendant claimed,
therefore, that the general classifications of the definition (e.g., "in-
vestment contract" or "any interest or instrument commonly known
as a 'security' ") must be limited by the specific categories (e.g.,
"stock" and "bond"). But Mr. Justice Jackson chose to "construe
the details of... [the] act in conformity with its dominating gen-
eral purpose, . . . treading] text in the light of context."'' As
the Fifth Circuit later commented, Joiner has "rejected any con-
struction of the Act on the basis of handy Latin aphorisms."'72
In a subsequent case, however, where the alleged "security"
transaction was a "note" and thus came within the literal coverage
168 E.g., trading stamps, theater tickets, etc. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3890,
1 CCH FED. SEc L REP. 5 1041 (Jan. 25, 1958).
These are certainly "evidences of indebtedness." The cooperative apartment
transactions (involving corporate stock) are also illustrative of the practice of analyz-
ing a transaction for its security aspects even though it appears prima facie to be within
the literal coverage of the statute. See text accompanying notes 138-43 supra. E.g.,
Willmont v. Tellone, 137 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (stock).
169 See Farrell v. United States, 321 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 992 (1964) (mortgage notes). "Appellants complain that the instruction [to
the jury] fails to define the terms 'any note' or 'evidence of indebtedness' appearing
in [Securities Act § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)
(1964)] .... In our view such ordinary terms are self-defined and require no further
definition." Farrell v. United States, supra at 417. See Lianos v. United States, 206
F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923 (1954); United States v.
Monjar, 47 F. Supp. 421, 427 (D. Del. 1942), aff'd, 147 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1944)
("receipts [for personal loans] certainly fall within the category of an 'evidence of
indebtedness"'); Whitlow & Associates v. Intermountain Brokers, Inc., CCH FED.
SEC. L REP. 5 91800 (D. Hawaii, March 25, 1966) (Transfer Binder 1964-1966);
SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961); State v. Davis, 131 N.W.2d 730
(N.D. 1964).
170 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
1711d at 350-51.
172 Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824
(1961).
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of the definition section, 7' the defendant claimed that the specific
categories should be limited, when necessary, by the generic notions
which had been developed under the amorphic phraseology of the
statute (e.g., "transferable share," "investment contract," or "any
commonly known as a security")." 4 The court, noting that the
ejusdem generis argument had already been judicially rejected, stated
summarily: "This instrument is dearly an 'evidence of indebted-
ness,' and as such falls within the statutory definition of securi-
ties. '"175
The foregoing illustrates the futility of talking in terms of apho-
ristic rules of construction. They are simply "anodynes for the
pains of reasoning." Joiner rejected one interpretative approach be-
cause it seemed inappropriate. Llanos v. United States7 ' summarily
rejected a seemingly proper method of construction because it was
based on an ejusdem generis argument.'77
(2) A Liberal-Formal Construction: The Double Threat.-Al-
though Mr. Justice Jackson expressly opted in Joiner to perform the
task of statutory interpretation unencumbered by rules of liberality
or strictness, it has been the overwhelming consensus of the recent
opinions that the securities laws are to be liberally construed. While
this approach is normally harmless, there is one instance in which it
can have pernicious effects. As has already been seen, some courts
are inclined to the view that all transactions falling within the spe-
cific categories of the definition sections are conclusively securities,
without the need for further inquiry to determine whether they pos-
sess the economic characteristics which would create a need for the
application of the securities laws.' 8 If such courts also adopt a
practice of liberally defining the terms "stock," "bond," "note," or
"evidence of indebtedness," any examination of "economic realities"
might well be foreclosed with respect to the majority of alleged
"security" transactions.'79
173 Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
923 (1954).
174 See generally Securities Act § 2, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
77b (1964).
.
75 Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cit. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 923 (1954).
176206 F.2d 852 (9th Cit. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923 (1954).
177 Fortunately, the court would have probably reached the same result if it had
pursued the interpretative approach suggested by the defendant.
178 E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Pa. Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consult-
ants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964).
179 This radical approach might have been responsible for the puzzling result in
Strauss v. State, 147 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966), wherein money orders were held
to be securities simply because they were "evidences of indebtedness." Id. at 370.
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(3) Prognosis.-So far, and fortunately, few questionable de-
cisions have resulted from a failure to apply the "economic realities"
test to transactions which come within the literal meaning of the
specific definitional categories."80 Moreover, the cases which have
faced the issue squarely have given the "economic realities" test
primacy over literal coverage. 81 On the merits, this is the most de-
sirable approach. If the formula and its underlying analysis prop-
erly delineate the essential elements of the "security" concept, it
should be applied pervasively. By use of the introductory phrase
"unless the context otherwise requires,"'.. the present definitional
provisions seem to sanction the use of an overriding test for identi-
fying a security. On the other hand, if future decisions follow a
pattern of making literal coverage determinative of security status
without further inquiry, the definition sections of the securities laws
should probably be amended to provide expressly that satisfaction
of the literal or formal aspects of the statute are not conclusive of
its applicability.'83
F. The Isolated and Private Transaction
As the final topic of this article, the thorny problem of deter-
mining the proper analysis and treatment for isolated and private
transactions, such as loan or purchase money notes and the small
offering of limited partnership interests, will be discussed. The
word "isolated" will be used to refer to the limited number of trans-
actions, and the term "private" will describe the buyers' financial
sophistication or their knowledge of the risk enterprise.
First, it should be noted that the transactions now under consid-
eration ordinarily possess, to some degree, all the essential economic
characteristics of a security which were previously elaborated. Of
course, it may happen that the buyer, in addition to being familiar
with the operations of the risk enterprise (so that the transaction is
"private"), may also play an active management role. In such a
case, one of the essential economic elements of a security would be
missing, and the "joint control" doctrine would apply. 84
180 As already noted, most of the cases which have taken the ultra-literal approach
would, coincidentally, have reached the same result by applying the "economic realities"
test.
1 81 See authorities cited note 164 supra.
182E.g., Securities Act § 2, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b
(1964).
183 Such a statute might first state the general and controlling test for a security in
terms of the "economic realities" formula. The categories in the present statute might
then be described as being prima fade or presumptively securities.
184 See text accompanying notes 123-31 supra.
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What should be the result if the control prerogative is lacking?
The question will be viewed first in the light of the present statutory
structure.
(1) Implications of the Statutory Scheme.-One has the feel-
ing that the special fraud protection of the securities laws should not
be applicable to the huge number of isolated transactions in which
the buyers are financially sophisticated and familiar with the opera-
tions of the risk enterprise. However, as the statutes are presently
written, the isolated nature of a transaction and the element of pri-
vateness are generally relevant only to the issue of whether a trans-
action should be exempt from registration or state administrative ap-
proval. If a transaction is isolated and private, the danger of fraud
is reduced both quantitatively and qualitatively; in other words,
these elements are factors which mitigate, but do not eliminate, the
probability of fraud. In the federal context, sections 3 and 4(2) of
the Securities Actl8 5 deal with such mitigating factors, but neither
section exempts a transaction from the anti-fraud provisions of sec-
tions 12(2) and 17 (a)."86
In the case of a promissory note, there is a further complication
arising from the introductory language of section 3(a).187 The
statute exempts various "classes of securities" from registration un-
der circumstances where the likelihood of fraud is substantially miti-
gated. One of the classes listed is "any note" having certain char-
acteristics which increase the probability that it will be circulated
among sophisticated or knowledgeable buyers. Thus, by the ex-
press language of section 3(a), there is a further statutory indication
that notes are "classes of securities" even though they are issued un-
der circumstances which greatly reduce the chances of fraud being
practiced upon the buyer.'"8 Stated differently, section 3 (a) fur-
nishes additional support for the proposition that factors in mitiga-
tion of the probability of fraud are relevant to the issue of exemp-
tion - not to the issue of security status. This inference is
185 48 Star. 75, 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c, 77d(2) (1964).
186 In the state context, UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 402, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5
4932 (1958) does not exempt transactions from the anti-fraud provisions of §§ 101
and 410(a) (2), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 55 4902, 4940 (1958).
187See also UNIFORM SEcuRITIEs AcT § 402(a), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 4932
(1958).
188 This argument has been made with respect to the California securities law. "The
exemption gives recognition to partnership interests... as securities. The [exemption]
statute, in fact, expressly calls such interests securities. They are merely exempted under
certain conditions ...." Jahn, lVhen Is a Security a Security?, 40 Los ANGELES B.
BULL. 75, 77 (1964). But cf. authorities cited note 195 infra.
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strengthened by the fact that Congress did exclude certain "notes"
from the definition of "security" in the Securities Exchange Act."8 9
Securities Exchange Act Rule 3a11-119O is also relevant. By its
provisions, "limited partnership" interests are included without qual-
ification in the "equity security" category. The language of the rule
certainly cuts against the view that the isolated and private nature
of such interests might result in their escaping "security" classifica-
tion.19
1
In summary, there seems to be little statutory justification for
excluding a transaction from "security" classification solely because
of its isolated and private nature. Still, for purposes of subsequent
discussion, it should be remembered that the danger of fraud is
qualitatively reduced if the transaction is private (involving buyers
who are financially sophisticated or who have knowledge of the
risk enterprise) and quantitatively reduced if the transaction is iso-
lated (involving only a few buyers).
(2) The "Cut-Off' Consideration.-Although the present stat-
utes may tend to indicate that a transaction should not escape se-
curity classification just because it is isolated and private, it may be
argued that Congress and the state legislatures did not intend the
special fraud procedures, protections, and remedies of the securities
laws to be applicable to every isolated and private purchase money
note or limited partnership interest. The policy of the argument
would probably be one of judicial and administrative economy. The
SEC, state agencies, and the courts should not have to resort to the
special anti-fraud machinery of the securities laws every time ABC
Corp. and John Doe issue a purchase money note. In other words,
there should be a point at which the applicability of all the provi-
189 "The term 'security'.. . shall not include... any note ... which has a maturity
at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months... " Exchange Act S 3 (a) (10),
48 Stat. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1964).
L90 17 C.F.R. § 24 0.3a11-1 (Supp. 1966). Presumably an "equity security" is
basically a "security." See Exchange Act § 3(a) (11), 48 Stat. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
78c(a) (11) (1964).
191 See 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 504-05 (2d ed. 1961), where it is sug-
gested that an isolated and private offering of interests in a limited partnership formed
under the Limited Partnership Act might not be considered an offering of securities.
However, it should be noted that, although a limited partner must consent to the sub-
stitution of new partners, he must also remain passive with respect to the management
of the enterprise. The joint control exception would therefore seem unavailable. More-
over, the troublesome characteristics of risk to initial investment and expectation of
profits are dearly present. When the foregoing considerations are coupled -with the
implications of the statutory structure, it is difficult to find much support for the sug-
gestion that an isolated and private offering of limited partnership interests should not
be deemed to involve the sale of securities. But, then, quanutoque bonus dormitat Horn-
eras.
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sions of the securities laws is "cut off," even when the economic
realities of a security are present. Such an argument seems hard
to digest simply on the ground that Congress and the state legisla-
tures did not intend to be picayune. However, the argument gains
some strength and perhaps tips the scales when it is thrown into
the balance with the previous suggestion that the danger of fraud is
reduced both qualitatively and quantitatively if a transaction is iso-
lated and private.
(3) The Decisions.-Even if it be assumed that an isolated
and private note is not a security at the time of its making, such a
note may later become a security if it is bought up and distributed to
the public. 9 ' Similarly, loan or purchase money notes of an indi-
vidual 9 ' or a corporation.94 may constitute securities when they are
offered to the public by the makers.
There is some judicial authority which would support the view
that an isolated and private note is not a security at the time of its
issuance. 9' On the other hand, it must be remembered that the
term "note" is one of the specific predicaments of the definition pro-
visions,"' and, as already observed, some courts show a marked
tendency to make literal coverage determinative on the issue of
"security" status. 9 '
192 Farrell v. United States, 321 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
992 (1964); Op. Cal. Att'y Gen., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. !j 70239 (Aug. 25, 1954);
Op. Mich. Att'y Gen., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 9 70360 (Oct. 29, 1957).
193Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
923 (1954); SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961); United States v.
Monjar, 47 F. Supp. 421 (D. Del. 1942), aff'd, 147 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1944).
194 People v. Leach, 290 Pac. 131 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930), appeal dismissed, 283
U.S. 808 (1931); State v. Davis, 131 N.W.2d 730 (N.D. 1964).
195 Cf. Cecil B. DeMille Prods., Inc. v. Woolery, 61 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1932); People
v. Davenport, 13 Cal. 2d 681, 91 P.2d 892 (1939); Nicholl v. Ipsen, 278 P.2d 927
(Cal. Ct. App. 1955); People v. Leach, supra note 194 (dictum). In California, there
is an exemption for notes not offered to the public. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(c).
Nonetheless, the language of the cases seems to go beyond the exemption and to imply
that private and isolated loan and purchase money notes are not really securities at all.
196 Recall, however, that the definition section of the Exchange Act excludes certain
"notes." Exchange Act § 3(a) (10), 48 Star. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10)
(1964).
197 See authorities cited notes 169, 179 supra. In a rather elliptically written
opinion, the district of Hawaii has come as close as any court to holding that a private
and isolated note is a security. See Whitlow & Associates v. Intermountain Brokers,
Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. R.P. 5 91800 (D. Hawaii, March 25, 1966) (Transfer Binder
1964-1966). The ultra-literal approach is dominant, with no discussion of the possible
distinctions arising from the fact that only one note was involved and was to be issued
to a buyer who appeared to be fully informed and financially sophisticated.
[VoL 18: 367
EXISTENCE OF A "SECURITY"
In the absence of facts supporting a finding of "joint control,"'98
recent opinions evidence a willingness to classify limited partnership
interests as securities, 9' even when the offerings seem rather iso-
lated and private."'
(4) Summary.--Unless the buyer actively participates in the
control of the issuer's activities, it seems that there is virtually no
statutory support for,2 ' and only slim judicial recognition of, the
view that notes and limited partnership interests should be excluded
from the 'security" category simply because they are isolated and
private transactons.2 2  Nonetheless, if it be recognized that the
danger of fraud is quantitatively and qualitatively reduced where a
transaction is both isolated and private, there is persuasive force in
the argument that the application of the special fraud procedures,
protections, and remedies of the securities laws should be cut off
short of the thousands of transactions which involve only a handful
of knowledgeable or sophisticated buyers.
In any event, if it were decided that transactions which are both
isolated and private should be excluded from the definition of "se-
curity," such a result could be assured only by an amendment of the
definition provisions.0 3 One result of such an amendment would
be to exclude entirely from the coverage of the securities laws some
of those transactions which are currently exempted only from regis-
tration or administrative approval. A second result would be that
the "joint control" exception would be partly subsumed by the defi-
nitional exclusion.0 4
1 98 Such a case would be highly unlikely in the context of a true limited partnership,
since the passive partners lose their limited liability status if they so much as poke their
noses in managements door.
19 9 Conroy v. Schultz, 194 A.2d 20 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1963) (public offering).
2 00 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70691 (Nov. 12, 1965) (twenty-
four interests).
2 0 1 The words, "unless the context otherwise requires," (e.g., at the beginning of
Securities Act § 2, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1964)) seem
to be eclipsed by the other inferences to be drawn from the statutory structure.
202 A recent opinion seems to hold the contrary. Whitlow & Associates v. Intermoun-
tain Brokers, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. g 91800 (D. Hawaii, March 25, 1966)
(Transfer Binder 1964-1966).2 03 The "economic realities" formula could be modified as indicated in note 47 supra.
20 4 The requirements under the present doctrine would seem to be at least (1)
familiarity with the risk enterprise at the time of the alleged security transaction, and
(2) the right to actively participate in the management of the enterprise thereafter.
Under an "isolated and private" exclusion, familiarity with the enterprise alone would
suffice if the transaction were truly isolated, i.e., involved few enough offerees.
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III. CONCLUSION
What is a "security"? This simple question has assumed major
proportions in light of the judicial and administrative trend towards
including many different types of transactions within the statutory
definition. The issue is all the more important in view of the ex-
panding jurisdictional base of the federal statutes and the increased
number of statutory remedies being successfully employed by securi-
ties purchasers."0 5
The subjection of the buyer's initial value to the risks of an en-
terprise with which he is not familiar and over which he exercises
no control seems to be the "economic reality" which most clearly
creates a need for the special fraud procedures, protections, and reme-
dies of the securities laws. There are several manifestations of risk,
some of which are difficult to discern, and therefore each transaction
must be carefully analyzed to make certain that the risk factor has
been accurately appraised.
In general, it is also necessary that the seller be responsible for
leading the buyer reasonably to expect some valuable benefits over
and above initial investment. Here again, it must be recognized
that there are several different species of valuable benefit.
Formulas can only serve as guidelines for reasoning. Accord-
ingly, this article has set forth what is thought to be an accurate
shorthand test for identifying a security and a pattern of analysis
which should aid the process of isolating each of the "economic reali-
ties" of a security.
Once the essential characteristics of a security have been accu-
rately identified and stated in the form of an analytical test, it is
only reasonable that such test should be controlling, even where the
form of a particular transaction comes within the literal coverage of
the definition provisions of the securities laws. If courts do not fol-
low this approach, it should be legislatively adopted by amending
the definition provisions.
On balance, there seems to be persuasive merit in the suggestion
205 Suppose S sells vacuum cleaners at an over-charge and promises to pay the buyers
a portion of the profits made on future referral sales. Assume also that such a transac-
tion is held to be a "certificate of interest or participation in [a) profit sharing agree-
ment." See SEC Rule 3all-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 3all-1 (Supp. 1966). If enough sales
are made and the seller has "total assets" exceeding one million dollars, registration of
these arrangements under the Exchange Act might be required. See Exchange Act
§12(g), 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 781(g) (1964).
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that isolated and private transactions should be excluded from se-
curity classification, even though all the economic realities of a se-
curity may be otherwise present However, the present statutory
structure gives rise to a clear inference that the isolated or private
nature of a transaction is relevant to the issue of exemption and not
to the question of security status. Therefore, if isolated and private
transactions are not to be considered securities, amendments will be
in order.
